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THE FUNCTION OF ARTICLE V 
AZIZ Z. HUQ† 
What good is Article V? The Constitution’s amendment rule renders the text 
inflexible, countermajoritarian, and insensitive to important contemporary constitu-
encies. Comparative empirical studies, moreover, show that textual rigidity is not 
only rare in other countries’ organic documents, but also highly correlated with 
constitutional failure. To promote our Constitution’s survival and to counteract 
Article V’s “dead hand” effect, commentators argue, Americans have turned to 
informal amendment through the courts or “super” statutes. Article V, the conven-
tional wisdom goes, is a dead letter.  
Against this pervasive skepticism, I propose instead that Article V may have 
played an important but hitherto unrecognized function in the early Republic. I 
hypothesize that Article V may have mitigated a “hold-up” dilemma that could 
have precluded the Constitution’s ratification and undermined its stability in the 
early Republic era. By hindering strategic deployment of textual amendment, 
Article V–induced rigidity fostered a virtuous circle of investment in new institu-
tions, such as political parties and financial infrastructure. Identification of Article 
V’s potential role in the early Republic leads to a more nuanced view of the 
Constitution’s amendatory regime. In effect, it raises the possibility that we have a 
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two-speed Constitution—with Article V–induced rigidity at the inception, supple-
mented gradually over time by informal judicial or statutory amendment protocols.  
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1166	
I. ARTICLE V IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY ............................... 1172	
A. The Mechanics of Article V .......................................................... 1172	
B. The Puzzle of Article V ............................................................... 1176	
1. Textual Rigidity and Constitutional Endurance .................. 1176	
2. The Informal Amendment Solution .................................. 1180	
C. The Normative Critique of Article V ............................................. 1185	
II. THE FUNCTION OF ARTICLE V IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC ......... 1191	
A. The Constitution as a Long-Term Relational Contract .................... 1192	
1. Two Views of Constitutions as Contracts........................... 1192	
2. The Hold-up Problem in Private Contracting .................... 1196	
B. The Role of Textual Rigidity in Promoting Constitutional  
Survival .................................................................................. 1204	
1. The Preconditions for Constitutional  
No-Modification Rules ...................................................... 1205	
2. Textual Rigidity as a Response to the  
Strategic Threat of Amendment ........................................ 1209	
3. Subconstitutional Investments and the Risk of Exit ............ 1212	
4. Subconstitutional Institutions with Lock-In  
Effects in the Early Republic .............................................. 1215	
a. National Political Parties ................................................ 1215	
b. The Bank of the United States ........................................ 1218	
C. Anchoring a Constitution in Cooperative Institutions ...................... 1220	
III. REVISITING THE PUZZLES OF ARTICLE V ................................ 1222	
A. The Infrequency of Rigid Constitutions ......................................... 1222	
B. Revisiting and Revising the Normative Critiques of Article V ........... 1227	
C. Rethinking “Historical Gloss” ...................................................... 1233	
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1235	
 
INTRODUCTION 
What good is Article V? The amendment rule crafted in 1787 renders the 
Constitution “one of the most inflexible” ever written.1 Commentators 
 
1 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 101 
(2009); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 49 (2010) (describing the amendment process as 
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calumnify Article V for making the constitutional text obdurately unrespon-
sive to changing public sentiment.2 Other scholars depict the handful of 
amendments that have passed its gauntlet as excessively nationalist in 
orientation.3 Worse, empirical studies of constitutions across the globe find 
that textual rigidity is highly correlated with early constitutional demise. In 
that light, the longevity of our federal Constitution “defies expectations.”4 
Article V has thus “become the constitutional provision . . . to hate.”5 
Scholarly cottage industries have emerged to extol its irrelevance and 
desuetude. Commentators explain how Americans have seized upon alterna-
tive avenues for constitutional change, such as the Supreme Court,6 frame-
work statutes,7 and populist “constitutional moments.”8 The conventional 
 
“intractable”); Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 
645-46 (2011) [hereinafter Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments] (“Article V imposes some of 
the most onerous hurdles in the world for the ratification of amendments.”); Donald S. Lutz, 
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 369 tbl.C-1 (1994) 
( f inding the U.S. Constitution to be the most difficult to amend among a group of thirty-two 
constitutions). 
2 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321 [here-
inafter Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules] (“[C]hanges in social circumstances and understand-
ings over time mean that, from a contemporary perspective, a number of core constitutional rules 
are now no longer optimal.”); Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 171, 171-73 (1995) (arguing that the difficulty of amendment “is in some tension with 
the goals of American constitutionalism”). 
3 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National 
Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1513 (2010) (“[T]he 
congressional amendment method has allowed Congress to promote amendments that accord with 
its own preferences . . . .”). 
4 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 65. See id. at 123 (arguing that “particular constitutions will 
inevitably reveal cases that do not seem to fit” the predictions of comparative analyses of 
constitutional survival, and that “[t]he United State is potentially one such case.”). 
5 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 
1954 (2003); see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1727 (2010) (“Article V is almost universally criticized as being too 
stringent rather than too permissive.”). For a particularly sharp version of the critique, see Griffin, 
supra note 2 at 172. 
6 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
905-06, 911-16 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] (arguing for the priority of judicial 
doctrine over constitutional text). In the same article, Strauss also makes the point that “legislators 
and even ordinary citizens, in their encounters with the Constitution, act in ways consistent with 
[a process of incremental constitutional change].” Id. at 925; accord David A. Strauss, The 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1505 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, 
Irrelevance] (“The people rule not through discrete, climactic, political acts like formal constitu-
tional amendments, but in a different way—often simply through the way they run their 
nonpolitical lives, sometimes combined with sustained political activity spread over a generation 
or more.”).  
7 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (“America enjoys a constitution of 
statutes supplementing and often supplanting its written Constitution as to the most fundamental 
features of governance.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 
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wisdom is that “our system would look the same today if Article V of the 
Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no 
provision for formal amendment.”9 
This Article questions the consensus view of Article V’s irrelevance. Ra-
ther than having always been superfluous, I suggest a different possibility: 
Article V–induced rigidity may have played an important, if unacknowl-
edged, role in promoting the Constitution’s survival at a key moment in 
American history—the early decades of the Republic. In the antebellum 
period, textual rigidity might have mitigated a problem of strategic “hold-
up” by key interest groups. Strategic invocation of the amendment power, I 
suggest, could have precluded the Constitution’s ratification, handicapped 
the development of essential elements of a functioning polity—such as an 
effectual financial infrastructure and a set of national political parties—and 
even precipitated secession. At the same time, the Constitution’s rigidity 
may have deferred conflict over highly divisive questions, unresolved in the 
Constitution’s text, until the Union could better withstand the shock of their 
resolution. Without Article V, therefore, there might today be eulogies 
rather than encomia for the constitutional text that was adopted in 1787. 
By contrast, informal amendments of the sort lauded today provide no 
solution to the early Republic’s “hold-up” problem. In the first decades of 
the new Republic, after all, neither the Court nor Congress played the 
expansive role that judges and legislators do today in crafting workarounds 
and constraints to nonfunctioning constitutional rules (even if they were 
extraordinarily creative when developing functional subconstitutional 
institutions to give life to the document’s larger aspirations). The use of 
non–Article V mechanisms of constitutional amendment to explain the 
Constitution’s early survival is therefore anachronistic. Instead, recognition 
of Article V’s potential stabilizing function in the early Republic should lead 
 
DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218-20 (2001) (introducing the common law framework and its potential for 
fluidity). 
8 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3-31 (1998) 
(offering up a theory of “higher lawmaking” to explain extratextual amendments during Recon-
struction and the New Deal); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) (“Congress would be obliged to 
call a convention to propose revisions [to the Constitution] if a majority of American voters so 
petition; and . . . an amendment or new Constitution could be lawfully ratified by a simple 
majority of the American electorate.”); see also Bruce Ackerman, We the People Rise Again, SLATE: 
THE HIVE ( June 4, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-
constitution/article/we-the-people-rise-again (advocating a popular movement to amend Article 
V). A variant on this argument relies on legislative action. See Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 
supra note 2, at 336-40 (arguing that courts should look sympathetically on legislative efforts to 
update constitutional rules). 
9 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1459.  
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to a more nuanced view of the Constitution’s amendment regime. In effect, 
we have a “two-speed” Constitution. On the one hand, Article V–induced 
rigidity during the early Republic enabled the development of national 
institutions necessary to anchor the new nation. On the other hand, those 
very institutions, over time, created flexibility-generating judicial or 
statutory amendment alternatives in ways that facilitated adaption to 
changing socioeconomic circumstances and shifting democratic preferences. 
Both formal rigidity and informal flexibility, on this account, have contrib-
uted to constitutional survival, albeit at different times and in different 
ways.  
That a constitution survives, of course, is no guarantee that its institu-
tional contents or substantive direction are optimal in social welfare terms 
or desirable on alternative normative grounds. Indeed, it is important to 
note at the outset that my analysis is oriented toward accounting for the 
brute fact of the Constitution’s survival. I do not intend to offer a normative 
or welfarist claim either to the effect that any specific feature of the federal 
Constitution is desirable, or that its continued survival in its observed form 
to the contemporary period is desirable. Most obviously, the Constitution as 
initially drafted fell far short of democratic and egalitarian ideals because it 
allowed for a limited franchise and accommodated the peculiar institution of 
slavery. Similarly, my argument is orthogonal to the oft-made contemporary 
claim that radical constitutional reform is desirable, say, on democratic 
grounds.10 I am concerned with explaining the fact of constitutional surviv-
al, and not with justifying the specific contents of that persisting legal 
document. 
The central task of this Article is to identify a potential causal mecha-
nism linking textual rigidity to constitutional survival in the early Republic. 
At the outset, I should underscore that my limited aim is to identify a 
plausible causal story, and to present an array of evidence to support that 
story. Proving conclusively a connection between a specific legal technology 
and large-scale social and governmental effects demands the application of 
econometric tools to large-n samples, an analysis that lies beyond the remit 
of my project here. Rather, by developing an empirically supported (if 
counterintuitive) account of a potential connection between one feature of 
the original Constitution and historical developments, I hope to unsettle the 
current consensus on constitutional amendment processes, and to open 
 
10 For a cogent argument along these lines, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMO-
CRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE 
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 20-24 (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRAT-
IC CONSTITUTION]. 
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another front in the debate on the diverse ways in which textual choices 
embedded in the 1787 Constitution may have influenced American political 
development. Although what I have to offer here is a possibility theorem 
rather than a conclusive proof, I develop my account in this Article without 
using the cumbersome conditional tense. This aura of lexical certainty 
donned for the sake of expository clarity, however, should not be mistaken 
for a strong causal claim. 
To underwrite my account, I draw on a law-and-economics literature 
about the design of long-term, relational contracts in private law. Like a 
constitution, many such contracts between private individuals are necessari-
ly “vague or silent on a number of key features.”11 The theoretical literature 
in economics identifies strategic breach and opportunistic renegotiation as 
central impediments to successful contracting. Recently, however, law-and-
economics scholars have suggested that a written contract’s internal re-
sistance to change (for example, through what is often termed a no-
modification clause) can promote efficient, after-the-fact investments by 
parties and can thereby increase the likelihood of the contract’s survival.12  
Mutatis mutandi, I posit that the same dynamic may have unfolded in the 
U.S. constitutional context during the early Republic. A constitution’s text 
embodies a deal between powerful national-level interest groups, each of 
whom can threaten to exit from the deal (most obviously by secession).13 
The drafters, like parties to a private deal, are unable to detail fully in the 
text how all conceivable disputes should be resolved.14 Hence, constitutions 
are inevitably incomplete.15 Once ratified, a necessarily incomplete 
 
11 Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 741 
(1999). 
12 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract 
Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 205 (1997) (“Contrary to traditional wisdom, the parties to a 
contract may be better off if the law enables them to tie their hands, or ties their hands for them, 
in a way that prevents them from taking advantage of certain ex post profitable modification 
opportunities.”). I rely on Jolls not for the specific mechanisms she identifies—respecting moral 
hazard and preference change over time—but for her general insight into the value of contractual 
rigidity. 
13 See, e.g., Daniel Sutter, Enforcing Constitutional Constraints, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 139, 
139-40 (1997) (analyzing constitutions as incomplete contracts); accord Philippe Aghion & Patrick 
Bolton, Incomplete Social Contracts, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 38, 38-41, 44-45 (2003) (explaining 
how constitutions are incomplete social contracts). 
14 See Tirole, infra note 11, at 741-42 (noting the pervasiveness of contractual incompleteness 
in political life). 
15 The phrase “incomplete contract” can refer either to (1) obligational incompleteness, where 
a term (such as price or quantity in the ordinary contracting context) is not included, or (2) 
insufficient state contingency, where the contractual obligations fail to fully realize the potential 
gains from trade in all future states of the world. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
 
  
2014] The Function of Article V 1171 
 
constitution will succeed only if interest groups invest in supplemental 
national institutions, such as political and financial infrastructure, to anchor 
the new nation. Inevitably, such investments must be tailored to a given 
constitution’s particulars. But this very specificity creates a serious prob-
lem.16 Parties who make such investments lock themselves in to this particu-
lar constitution. They thus make themselves vulnerable to “hold-ups” by 
other parties, who can try to expropriate a greater share of national wealth 
via renegotiation of the original deal through the strategic use of textual 
amendments. A strategic hold-up might involve either changing a rule that 
is in the text already, or addressing a question the original text left unre-
solved. Either way, proponents of a strategic amendment hope to exploit 
the fact that other parties with post-ratification investments will cede some 
surplus—and hence accept a disfavored amendment—rather than risk 
constitutional failure and wholesale loss of their constitution-specific 
investments.17 The shadow of strategic amendment threats will undermine a 
constitution’s chances of getting off the ground. Post-ratification, it can also 
engender inefficient underinvestment and conflict.  
Textual rigidity is able to mitigate directly these problems by limiting 
parties’ ability to engage in strategic post-ratification hold-ups.18 To borrow 
from Albert Hirschman’s famous vocabulary of exit, voice, and loyalty, 
rigidity limits opportunities for voice (that is, amendment) as a way of 
maintaining loyalty (that is, investment in new national institutions which 
might be subconstitutional in nature).19 At the same time, rigidity indirectly 
reduces the likelihood of outright exit through secession and facilitates 
“cooperative investment” in new subconstitutional institutions such as 
 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). In this Article, I 
mean the phrase “incomplete contracting” to refer to insufficient state contingency.  
16 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 71 (explaining how, in drafting constitutions, “too 
much detail can exacerbate the problem of uncertain payoffs”). 
17 The idea of a “hold-up” in contract law is broader than the sense in which I am using the 
term. See 1A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 184, at 148-49 (1963) 
(using the term to refer to a situation in which a party to a contract, through economic duress, 
forces the other party to agree to a contract modification); see also Steven Shavell, Contractual 
Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327-31 (2007) (providing a range of 
examples of contractual hold-up problems). 
18 This assumes that the Constitution is substantively justified. Of course, there may be a 
“severe conflict between constitutionality and justice.” MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND 
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 13 (2006).  
19 To be clear, my argument is distinct from Hirschman’s. His book is in large measure a 
critique of the perverse effects of relying on exit rights, and a description of alternative dynamics, 
such as one in which “loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, 
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
STATES 78 (1970). The analogies between constitutional commitment and amendment in my 
argument and loyalty and voice in Hirschman’s are suggestive, but hardly exact parallels.  
  
1172 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1165 
 
political parties and banks. Such cooperative investments not only enable 
the realization of welfare gains inherent in the new constitutional order,20 
but also anchor parties into the constitutional deal by raising their cost of 
exit.21 In effect, Article V encourages all parties to have “skin in the game.” 
A positive feedback mechanism thereby arises, as investment induces 
confidence, which in turn yields more investment; the prospect of exit 
recedes from sight. The odd fact that the Constitution is famously silent 
about secession is explained by the fact that Article V itself raises the costs 
of secession, hence making it unattractive.  
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the conventional 
view of Article V, emphasizing the puzzle of our Constitution’s surprising 
longevity. The heart of my argument is Part II, which posits a causal link 
between textual inflexibility and constitutional survival. I also furnish here 
some preliminary evidence to substantiate the possibility that the mecha-
nism operated during the early Republic. Part III then identifies and 
responds to potential objections, elaborates some consequences of the 
foregoing analysis, and concludes by pointing toward how the analysis in 
Part II intimates the existence of a de facto “two-speed” account of the 
Constitution.  
I. ARTICLE V IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
This Part first describes how Article V works and explores the critiques 
offered by both comparative constitutional scholars and normative constitu-
tional theorists. I also explore why informal mechanisms of constitutional 
amendment, judicial decisions or super-statutes cannot explain the fact that 
our Constitution’s longevity “defies expectations.”22  
A.  The Mechanics of Article V 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
 
20 See Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contract-
ing, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (1999) (defining a cooperative investment as one that “gener-
ate[s] a direct benefit for the trading partner”).  
21 The basic intuition here echoes Ernest Young’s observation that there is “a set of political 
institutions” that do “most of our constitutive work [(that is, establishing the various instruments 
through which governance happens}] . . . outside the Constitution itself.” Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 456 (2007). 
22 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 65; see id. (“There may be good reasons to adopt the Phil-
adelphia model . . . but constitutional endurance is not one of them.”). 
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the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitu-
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the oth-
er Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided 
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thou-
sand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and 
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate.23  
Article V thus creates what is basically a two-stage process. The first 
stage—proposal—is accomplished either by supermajorities in Congress or 
the several states’ legislatures. The second stage—ratification—requires 
even larger supermajorities of the states acting in either legislatures or 
conventions.24 Formally, Article V seems to provide alternative channels at 
each stage.  In practice, however, only Congress proposes amendments, and 
with one exception, only state legislatures do the ratifying.25 The de facto 
threshold for constitutional amendment, therefore, is a two-thirds superma-
jority in both chambers of Congress, plus successful votes in seventy-five 
state houses (assuming one is Nebraska’s unicameral chamber).26  
 
23 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
24 The states are permitted to determine their own thresholds for ratification. See Dyer v. 
Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1306 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court) (explaining that the framers 
intended to leave the determination of the threshold for ratification up to state ratifying assem-
blies).  
25 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 734 (1993) (noting that all amendments to date have been 
congressionally proposed and that no national convention has ever been called); Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 28 CONST. 
COMMENT. 53, 60 (2012) (making the same observation); see also RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL 
CONVENTION 126 (1988) (“For the first and so far only time since the Constitution itself was 
ratified, Congress in 1933 specified that ratification [of the Twenty-First Amendment] was to be 
accomplished by state conventions rather than by state legislatures.”). One consequence is that 
uncertainty lingers about how conventions might work. Compare William W. Van Alystne, Does 
Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 
DUKE L.J. 1295, 1304-05 (concluding that conventions of limited scope are constitutional), with 
Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 196-
200 (1972) (taking the opposite view). 
26 One reason for the dominance of the congressional proposal method is its lower transac-
tion costs. See Lutz, supra note 1, at 360-62 (explaining the author’s assignment of index scores to 
the amendment processes described in Article V, and noting that the congressional proposal 
method is relatively less difficult on account of its fewer stages).  
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The Framers included multiple mechanisms in Article V in response to 
cross-cutting pressures at the Philadelphia Convention.27 Different factions 
amongst the delegates distrusted either the proposed federal government or 
the several states.28 Delegates also divided “between the contending repub-
lican faiths of the era, often characterized as Whig versus Federalist.”29 
Whereas Whigs believed “people shared a capacity and willingness to 
identify and support the best interests of the community,” Federalists 
“assumed that people’s interests varied and that government served as an 
arbiter among them.”30 To allay fears on all sides, the Convention settled on 
a “compromise” mechanism that allowed either the federal government or 
state institutions to be bypassed entirely.31  
Whether Convention members expected the combination of veto gates 
and voting rules contained in Article V to be especially onerous, though, is 
unclear. On the one hand, the delegates were keenly aware of their own 
fallibility. On June 11, 1787, Virginia delegate George Mason cautioned that 
the “plan now to be formed will certainly be defective,” and so 
“[a]mendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide 
for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance 
and violence.”32 On the other hand, recorded votes belie Mason’s concerns. 
 
27 See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 55-60 (1996) (describing the debates surrounding amendment 
procedures at the Philadelphia Convention). The following account is heavily indebted to Kyvig’s 
fine historical work. 
28 On September 15, 1787, George Mason expressed concern that “[a]s the proposing of 
amendments is . . . to depend . . . ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind 
would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily 
believed would be the case.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
629 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]. Elbridge Gerry, on the contrary, 
feared an abuse of power over constitutional amendments by the states. See id. at 557-58 (noting 
Gerry’s concern that “two thirds of the States may obtain a Convention, a majority of which can 
bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether”). Alexander 
Hamilton did not share Gerry’s concern, but warned that “[t]he State Legislatures will not apply 
for alternations but with a view to increase their own powers.” Id. at 558; see also KYVIG, supra 
note 27, at 56-57 (summarizing debate between Gerry and Hamilton).  
29 KYVIG, supra note 27, at 61. 
30 Id. at 61-62. 
31 See id. at 60 (“Article V evinced the essential compromise struck between the proponents 
of a strong central government and the advocates of retained state power.”).  
32 1 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 202-03; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CON-
STITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION] 
(describing a concern among the delegates that “an overly stiff amendment mechanism in a 
governing document ultimately doomed the document to irrelevance by inviting outright 
repudiation”). On the other hand, Philip Hamburger has argued that “[i]n 1776, it was assumed 
that a constitution had to be permanent, in the sense of being lasting and even rigid, subject only 
to alteration by the people.” Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social 
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On September 10, for example, the Convention voted to reject a ratification 
requirement of two-thirds of the states and instead unanimously endorsed a 
three-fourths voting rule for ratification.33  
During the ensuing ratification debates, partisans for the Constitution’s 
adoption characterized its amendment rule as an optimal one. Article V, 
wrote Madison in the Federalist No. 43, was “stamped with every mark of 
propriety” and “guards equally against that extreme facility, which would 
render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which 
might perpetuate its discovered faults.”34 This Madisonian position lingers 
in some quarters, where Article V is still glossed as “a compromise between 
two competing policies” and “a sensible mechanism for change.”35 Notwith-
standing Madison’s comments, the new Constitution’s amendment rule 
received comparatively little attention in the floor debates of the several 
state conventions.36 Only in the Virginia Convention did Patrick Henry’s 
 
Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 263 (1989). On this view, only “perfecting” amendments were 
envisaged by the Framers. Id. at 301. Other historians dispute this view. See, e.g., GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 613 (1969) (“The 
American governments never pretended . . . to perfection or to the exclusion of future im-
provements.”). Whoever has the better of the historical argument, the “perfecting” understanding 
of Article V seems squarely at odds with constitutional practice as it developed.  
33  RECORDS, supra note 28, at 555. The vote on the motion for a two-thirds voting rule was 
held first, and was defeated six to five. Id.  
34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 284 ( J ames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). On the 
other hand, in the final Federalist paper, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the ease of amending 
pursuant to Article V, and contrasted it to the difficulty of “establishing, in the first instance, a 
complete Constitution.” Id. NO. 85, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. NO. 23, at 184-85 
(Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that because the “circumstances that endanger the safety of 
nations are infinite, . . . no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed” on national security 
powers, thereby suggesting another exogenous motor of constitutional change); id. NO. 37, at 243 
( J ames Madison) (arguing that the Constitution “provide[d] a convenient mode of rectifying 
. . . errors, as future experience may unfold them”).  
35 Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amend-
ment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 144 (1996); see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921) (“[A]ll 
amendments must have the sanction of the people of the United States, the original fountain of 
power, . . . and . . . ratification by [representative] assemblies in three-fourths of the States 
shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people’s will and be binding on all.”). David Kyvig 
also insists that “in reality the amending process carried out the Founders’ intentions.” KYVIG, 
supra note 27, at 475. This is a surprising claim given that Kyvig himself lucidly documents the 
plural, inconsistent and indeed mutually contradictory “intentions” of the various members of the 
Philadelphia Convention. See id. at 42-65. 
36 According to Pauline Maier’s recent comprehensive study, Article V was either briefly 
praised (e.g., in Massachusetts) or not a subject of comment (e.g., in New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, and New York). PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 191, 220, 371, 419 (2010). Gaps in the documentary record mean 
that we cannot be certain there is ratification-related debate on Article V yet to be explored. 
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bleak assessment that “the way to amendments is, in my conception, shut” 
stimulate some extended debate about amendment protocols.37  
Article V, in sum, was a compromise between fundamentally divergent 
accounts of government and human nature. It passed into final, binding 
organic law attended by relatively little scrutiny.38 It was certainly not one 
of the flashpoints of the ratification debates. Its puzzles would instead ripen 
only in the fullness of time. 
B.  The Puzzle of Article V 
Neither Madison nor Patrick Henry possessed the empirical resources to 
establish whether Article V was, in fact, anomalously rigid or excessively 
yielding. Only in the last two decades have political scientists and legal 
scholars developed a stock of comparative knowledge about how constitu-
tions work that permits the benchmarking of Article V against other 
constitutional amendment rules.39 This section sketches the basic findings of 
that empirical research to show that Article V is indeed, as Patrick Henry 
complained, unusually rigid. More importantly, the document’s survival in 
light of this rigidity has puzzled scholars, who have otherwise observed a 
strong positive correlation between textual inflexibility and constitutional 
death. That puzzle furthermore cannot be dissolved by recourse to extra 
textual modalities of amendment.  
1.  Textual Rigidity and Constitutional Endurance 
From the first major comparative study of why constitutions survive, it 
has been clear that Article V is an outlier. In 1994, political scientist Donald 
Lutz published a path-marking study using data sets covering fifty Ameri-
can state and thirty-two national constitutions.40 Comparing amendment 
processes on a single numerical scale, Lutz found that “the U.S. Constitu-
tion has the second-most-difficult amendment process.”41 Lutz’s study 
analyzed the correlation between amendment rate and constitutional 
 
37 KYVIG, supra note 27, at 78. 
38 Cf. Melissa Schwartzberg, The Arbitrariness of Supermajority Rules, 49 SOC. SCI. INFO. 61, 
72 (2010) (identifying a “lack of reasons supporting the supermajoritarian amendment threshold” 
at the Philadelphia Convention). 
39 Indeed, some argue that this area of study is still in its infancy. See David S. Law, Consti-
tutions (“[W]e know little about the conditions under which [constitutional text] succeeds, in the 
sense of either defining actual practice or improving social welfare.”), in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 376, 384 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 
2010). 
40 Lutz, supra note 1, at 355. 
41 Id. at 362. The most difficult, somewhat worryingly, was the former Yugoslavia. 
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survival.42 It identified a curvilinear relationship between amendment rates 
and durability, with constitutions tending to survive longest if amended at 
“moderate” rates.43 Reanalysis of the same data by other scholars, however, 
suggested that the relationship between amendment rate and durability was 
“very weak” and “one can have extremely little confidence in the estimated 
optimal rate of amendment.”44 Lutz’s finding might also be explained by 
missing variables in his regressions. For example, a country exposed to 
external military or fiscal shocks may as a result both amend its constitution 
frequently and repeatedly skirt constitutional death.45 
More recent empirical work avoids these criticisms. The most compre-
hensive effort along these lines is a study based on data from about 935 
constitutional systems operating between 1789 and 2006.46 This study finds 
“strong evidence” that “formally rigid constitutions . . . die more frequent-
ly” than flexible ones.47 To identify predictors of constitutional endurance, 
the study’s authors—Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton—construct a multivari-
ate event-history model. Their model enables calculation of a baseline 
estimate of constitutional mortality.48 It then allows for estimation of the 
effect of diverse endogenous design and exogenous economic and political 
 
42 Id. at 360 tbl.2, 362 tbl.5. Both tables divide the sample into eight subsamples based on the 
rate of a constitution’s formal amendment, and then show the average duration of a constitution in 
that subsample. 
43 Id. at 360, 362. 
44 John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 501, 522 (1997); see also Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative 
Perspective 96, 105 (Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 347, 2011) 96, 
105, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1833634 (noting that “for many existing studies, the 
number of independent observations is sufficiently small that there is not enough statistical power 
to pick up the distinct effect of various hurdles to amendment”). 
45 Ferejohn makes the same point about Lutz’s results, albeit with different examples. Fere-
john, supra note 44, at 524 (“[T]here may be other important unmeasured determinants of 
amendment rates, perhaps the organization of the parties, constitutional traditions, or political 
culture.”). In addition, any effect of an amendment rule on constitutional survival may be 
confounded by other constitutional design decisions. See TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO 
TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS 105-12 (2003) (presenting cross-
national data on the effects of these design variables). A further problem is that powerful elites 
may respond to changes in formal institutions by establishing informal regimes that “partially or 
entirely offset” changes in de jure power. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of 
Power, Elites, and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 287 (2008) (noting that such offsetting is 
“broadly consistent with a number of historical examples”). 
46 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 48-51 (describing the methodology whereby the da-
taset was constructed). A constitution is defined as a document or set of documents that is self-
identified in its text as a higher law, or that is defined as “the basic pattern of authority by 
establishing or suspending an executive or legislative branch of government.” Id. at 49. 
47 Id. at 82.  
48 Id. at 129. 
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factors.49 To mitigate collinearity problems, the study defines “amendment 
ease” by regressing amendment rate “on a set of amendment procedure 
variables as well as on a host of factors that should predict political 
reform . . . .”50 This study is presently the gold standard in empirical 
comparative constitutional analysis. 
Consistent with Lutz’s study, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton find that 
the U.S. Constitution “is scored as one of the most inflexible” ever ratified, 
scoring a 0.04 on a scale from 0 to 1.0.51 They further conclude that amend-
ment ease is a “strong predictor of longevity,” although its effect is curvilin-
ear, with the easiest-to-amend documents being especially fragile.52 In 
addition to textual flexibility, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton conclude that 
“inclusive provisions,” greater textual scope (that is, more subject-matter 
coverage), and greater specificity promote a constitution’s survival.53  
To explain these results, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton offer a general 
causal model for the life and death of constitutions. They argue that the 
creation of post-ratification enforcement mechanisms is “key” to constitu-
tional survival.54 That is, they emphasize how constitutional designers must 
focus on providing sufficient “sticks” for enforcers in the basic document to 
ensure parties do not shade or defect after ratification. My argument, 
developed in subsequent parts of this Article, will focus less on sticks and 
more on positive enticements. In that regard, my analytic focus diverges 
from that of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton. They, to be sure, briefly touch 
on the possibility that “carrots” may matter when they talk of “locking in” a 
constitution by “establish[ing] increasing streams of political benefits [that] 
may be better able to withstand external pressures . . . .”55 But this is not 
their main focus. But as Part II aims to show, it is also possible that consti-
tutional survival derives from a mechanism that turns less on the prospect 
of punishing defectors and more on the entanglement of contracting parties 
in positively productive relationships. 
All three of the factors highlighted by the Elkins–Ginsburg–Melton 
empirical analysis as correlates of constitutional survival make enforcement 
of constitutional rules easier by increasing the number of stick-wielders. 
Inclusivity draws into the constitutional bargain a larger number of 
 
49 Id. at 129-39 (describing the model in detail). 
50 Id. at 101. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 140. 
53 Id. at 139, 141.  
54 See id. at 76 (“[A] key factor in the calculus of . . . breach is the ability of other parties to 
the bargain to enforce the terms of the agreement.”). 
55 Id. at 91. 
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potential enforcers, whose diverse interests are then reflected in an increas-
ingly specific text.56 Flexibility is desirable because the ease of amendment 
“induces smaller groups to . . . mobilize for constitutional amendment” by 
giving them a greater “stake in the survival of the document,” which can be 
amended to expand the bargain and account for emergent interests and 
problems.57 In contrast, a terse, inflexible, and under inclusive constitution 
is likely to sap the incentives for potential enforcers to organize and act for 
the collective good.58  
This model is puzzling when applied to the U.S. context. As Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton candidly say, “specificity, inclusion, and flexibility” 
are not virtues possessed by the 1787 Constitution.59 To the contrary, our 
Constitution’s longevity “defies expectations” on this theory because it 
“embodies many of the elements that . . . should lead to increased mortality 
rates.”60 This puzzle, it should also be noted, resists easy dissolution by 
ascribing American national success solely to economic and demographic 
factors. The analysis performed by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton controls 
for a host of such nonlegal factors and still finds text to be a significant 
influence on constitutional survival. Their work, in other words, is strong 
counsel against the simple expedient of disregarding textual specifications as 
epiphenomenal formalisms. To the contrary, the fixed verbal content of 
constitutional law seems to matter, even if it is not exhaustive of all poten-
tial causes of regime survival. Assuming that one takes the U.S. Constitu-
tion as having survived until now61—as both they and I do—it is difficult to 
reconcile textual rigidity and constitutional survival in the American 
context.  
 
56 Id. at 97. 
57 Id. at 89. 
58 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton describe the initial Constitution as having “low” initial 
levels of inclusion. Id. at 163. There is persistent debate on how to gauge the representativeness of 
the Constitution’s drafting. Compare AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 18, 
64-68 (arguing that ratification involved “the widest imaginable participation rules” at least “in 
the eighteenth century,” and also underscoring the democratic pedigree of Article I’s franchise 
rule), with WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 181 (2007) (noting that “the Framers were, demographically speaking, unrepresentative in 
the extreme” and “felt the need to conceal their intentions” to overthrow the Articles of Confeder-
ation because of this unrepresentativeness).  
59 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 166. 
60 Id. at 65.  
61 One might alternatively argue that the Constitution failed in 1861, and that the post–Civil-
War dispensation is fundamentally a new one. This view is sufficiently unusual today and I do not 
address it in this Article. 
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2.  The Informal Amendment Solution 
But is there a simple solution to this puzzle? To explain the survival of 
the U.S. Constitution, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton contend that Article V 
has been supplemented with “informal flexibility . . . through [judicial] 
interpretation and the various bisectional compromises . . . .”62 They build 
on other scholars’ proposals that formal “constitutional amendments have 
not been an important means of changing the constitutional order” in light 
of alternative, informal means.63 Commentators have thus elaborated Court-
centered accounts, which point out that once congressional or executive 
power swells, it is the judiciary that steps in to legitimate the change.64 
These accounts point to decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland65 and 
Crowell v. Benson66 as instances in which the Supreme Court has de facto 
ratified constitutional transformation.67 Alternatively, Congress-centered 
accounts of constitutional change identify framework “superstatutes” as key 
vectors of constitutional change that “transform Constitutional baselines,” 
“create entrenched governance structures and norms,” and guide the devel-
opment of norms otherwise only ambiguously articulated in the text of the 
Constitution.68 On the other hand, constitutional change can be identified 
as a series of “transformative moments” at which politically mobilized 
popular movements change the “higher law” without changing the constitu-
tional text.69 Given these informal alternatives to Article V, the mystery of 
 
62 Id. at 177; see also id. at 163 (“Judicial review (as well as evolution of popular understand-
ings) has provided a mechanism for updating the Constitution, thus ensuring that its allegedly 
timeless principles are applied to modern realities . . . .”). 
63 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1459; cf. Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of 
Amending Clauses, 13 CONST. COMMENT 107, 109 (1996) [hereinafter Levinson, Political 
Implications] (“[I]t is naive [sic] to identify ‘amendment’ only as formal textual additions (or 
subtractions).” (emphasis in original)). 
64 See Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1467-69 (“[I]t may be that majoritarian acts (or 
judicial decisions), precisely because they do not require that the ground be prepared so thorough-
ly, can force the pace of change in a way that supermajoritarian acts cannot.”). 
65 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
66 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
67 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1473 (“[I]t seems fair to say that Crowell essentially 
ratified a fait accompli.”). 
68 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 6-9; id. at 12-13 (“America enjoys a constitution 
of statutes supplementing . . . its written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of 
governance . . . .”). 
69 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1056-57 (1984) (“[T]wentieth century Americans rejected the higher law handed down by the 
Supreme Court . . . and insisted that they too had something to contribute . . . .”). For an 
application of this theory to Reconstruction, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 142-50 (1991). Critiques of Ackerman’s theory have refined the account of the 
specific mechanisms involved. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
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the Constitution’s rigidity might seem readily explained. Simply put, it is 
easy to amend the Constitution—just not through Article V.  
But the puzzle is not so quickly solved. Alternative mechanisms that rely 
on legislative or judicial action70 cannot explain constitutional survival, 
particularly in the early Republic, for three reasons. First, neither judicial 
benedictions nor landmark statutes can entirely pick up the slack left by 
Article V–induced rigidity in a way that explains the Constitution’s survival 
because neither is a full substitute for Article V. Judicial and legislative 
mechanisms are typically channels for adding to, not subtracting from, the 
constitutional fabric. Neither Congress nor the courts can easily eliminate 
undesirable constitutional text.71 Imagine, to use a non-U.S. example, an 
emergency powers provision that destabilizes governments by vesting 
presidents with the power to declare unilaterally suspensions of legislative 
rule.72 Neither legislative nor judicial action can do much to resolve the 
 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of 
“[p]artisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary”); James E. Fleming, 
We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1522-27 (1998) (emphasizing the 
importance of creative acts of judicial review). But see David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We 
Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40 (1990) (“[T]he bottom line is that if 
the Constitution is to continue to be the ultimate source that protects individual rights against 
encroachment by government power and political majorities, then the affirmative words in article 
V must be understood to negative other conceivable modes of amendment.”). 
70 For the purposes of this discussion, I treat Ackerman’s theory of controversial moments as 
a form of constitutional change that occurs through legislatures and courts. The populist and 
political elements of his accounts are orthogonal to my point here.  
71 See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 160 (“Clever 
adaptive interpretation is not always possible, however, and Article V has made it next to 
impossible to achieve such adaption where amendment is thought to be necessity.”). This is not to 
say it is impossible to eliminate constitutional text through legislative or judicial action. An 
example may be the treatment of the Republican Form of Government Clause of Article IV. See 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) ( f inding arguments under that clause nonjusticiable). It might 
also be argued that the Court once read certain rights clauses so narrowly as to sap them of any 
real meaning. Until District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), some might have said as 
much about the Second Amendment. But it would seem more difficult for the Court to achieve 
the same elimination effect respecting much-criticized structural provisions, such as apportion-
ment rules for the House and Senate or the Electoral College mechanism. See LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 49-62, 81-97 (developing further criticisms 
of the Senate and Presidential selection). Congress, however, might be able in some instance to 
develop workarounds. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503 
(2009) (describing constitutional workarounds involving the use of other texts). 
72 A well-known example is Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. See RENÉ BRUNET, 
THE NEW GERMAN CONSTITUTION 308 ( J oseph Gollomb trans., 1922) (permitting the 
suspension of certain fundamental rights in the event that “public safety and order . . . is 
materially disturbed or endangered”). 
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ensuing hazards.73 Thus, the limits on informal amendment at least hint 
that something more is needed to explain the Constitution’s survival. 
Second, legislative and judicial mechanisms for constitutional change 
outside Article V interact with and hinder enforcement mechanisms identi-
fied by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton. Amending outside Article V increases 
the cost of specificity-based constitutional enforcement by increasing 
uncertainty about what is in the Constitution, thereby making it more costly 
to identify and police violations. Pursuant to a regime in which informal 
amendment is allowed, violators of an original deal can clothe transgressions 
in the terminology of extratextual amendment. They can thus seek to 
obscure self-dealing conduct. Moreover, historical experience suggests that 
doubt will often arise as to whether a non–Article V constitutional amend-
ment has even worked.74 This creates even more uncertainty about the 
Constitution’s content. Finally, the potential for extra-textual amendment 
undermines potential enforcers’ incentives to labor for changes to be 
memorialized in constitutional text. In all these ways, the availability of 
extratextual amendment works at cross-purposes to the enforcement 
mechanism envisaged by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton. This suggests that 
informal amendment mechanisms have complex and partially offsetting 
effects—undermining some causes of constitutional enforcement while 
contributing to the regime’s durability in other ways. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for my purposes, the key legisla-
tive and judicial contributions to constitutional development come too late 
to explain the survival of the 1787 Constitution. As Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton persuasively demonstrate, a constitution is at gravest risk of demise 
in the very first two decades of its existence.75 And yet the leading account 
of our “republic of statutes” focuses on such enactments as the Sherman Act 
of 1890, Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 
Social Security Act of 1935.76 With the exception of the Sherman Act, these 
 
73 Could an undesirable provision be remedied simply by being ignored? Although there are 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution that have fallen into desuetude, it is worth noting the role that 
courts have played in stymieing their development. See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 129-30 (1912) (treating the Guaranty Clause of Article IV as raising only 
political questions); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74-77 (1873) (narrowly construing the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In practice, it seems that 
desuetude is enabled by judicial intervention.  
74 See Keith E. Whittington, From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the 
Constitution, 10 CONST. POL. ECON. 405, 411 (1999) (developing this point in reference to 
Ackerman’s account of dualist democracy).  
75 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 129 (noting that constitutions have a “median survival 
time” of nineteen years and that their risk of death peaks at age seventeen).  
76 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, 9-24. 
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key statutory props of the American constitutional order are largely twenti-
eth-century creations.77 The temporal distribution of judicial review is also 
such that it must be rejected as an adequate substitute for Article V at the 
instant of greatest need.78 Judicial review of state or federal statutes was rare 
prior to the Civil War.79 This is not surprising: the federal judiciary devel-
oped institutional capacity to hear the volume of cases necessary to play a 
leading role in constitutional development only after the Civil War,80 and 
analyses of antebellum judicial review furnish scant reason to believe courts 
were an effective substitute for Article V change. There are two instances in 
which the Court invalidated federal statutes before the Civil War. In the 
first instance, the Court struck down an insignificant fragment of the 1789 
Judiciary Act based upon a dubious statutory interpretation and an equally 
doubtful gloss on the Constitution’s text.81 Almost sixty years later, the 
 
77 Another possible exception concerns what Eskridge and Ferejohn call the “monetary con-
stitution.” Id. at 311. But their argument is that “an independent central bank presiding over a 
national paper currency,” which they view as the central and defining element of the monetary 
constitution, “emerged as a superstatuory framework regime only in fits and starts.” Id. at 313. 
Only with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did the framework finally distill. Id. at 333-39. Thus, 
even the monetary constitutions fit the temporal pattern they imply in other domains. 
78 Indeed, the leading argument in favor of “th[e] claim about the irrelevance of the amend-
ment process” is explicitly offered “in the context of a mature democratic society, not a fledgling 
constitutional order.” Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1460. The mechanism I develop below 
concerns “how [a constitution] becomes established in the first place” and not “how a constitution-
al system changes.” Id. My argument has a distinct domain from Strauss’s, and may be seen as 
complementary rather than in conflict with that account. 
79 See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 597 (2012) 
[hereinafter Huq, Judicial Self-Restraint] (“[J]udicial activism began in the post–Civil War and 
Reconstruction period . . . .”); see also Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the 
Language of Judicial Authority, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 180-81 (2007) (counting twenty pre-
Civil War cases in which the Court imposed constitutional limits on congressional power but 
finding no “judicial tradition, activist or restrained, . . . at the time when Dred Scott was 
decided”). In recent years, revisionist accounts of judicial review have sought to identify a more 
robust role for the Court in the early republic. But even self-consciously revisionist accounts 
marshal only weak evidence of judicial activity on constitutional matters during that period. See 
Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts of Congress, 
1789–2006, at 22-30 (May 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=1475660 (graphing trends in judicial review). 
80 See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002) (arguing that 
the “understaffed and unpaid” judicial infrastructure headed by justices perennially distracted by 
the travails of riding circuit in 1800 had “become by century’s end a real third branch of govern-
ment”). 
81 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“If then the courts are to regard the con-
stitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, 
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”). That same year, the 
Court ducked confrontation with Congress by allowing the legislature to disestablish existing 
federal courts—starkly illustrating the court’s powerlessness in the teeth of political opposition. 
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Court once again invalidated a federal law, and this time garnered vigorous 
criticism while failing to check a march to civil war and a concomitant 
repudiation of the Court’s legal reasoning.82 Given this antebellum track 
record of judicial review of federal statutes, it simply cannot be said that 
federal courts any more than Congress effectively carried the heavy respon-
sibility for ratifying and enabling fundamental change in the early Republic 
as they arguably do today.  
One response to this point would be to insist on the constitutional crea-
tivity of early generations of American politicians. Indeed, it is indubitably 
true that early legislators viewed the Constitution as a central lodestar for 
their work, as the late David Currie demonstrated in his magisterial history 
of the Constitution in Congress.83 Moreover, there was no wholesale 
absence of “unconventional adaptation” and “political innovation” through 
the political crises of the early Republic.84 Nevertheless, the most important 
constitutional crisis of the early Republic produced a rare constitutional 
change in the form of the Twelfth Amendment, rather than some extra-
textual shift.85 Further, Currie’s history suggests that fidelity to the Consti-
tution limited, rather than expanded, the options from which conscientious 
legislators could choose. Path-dependent institutional legacies from the 
ensuing decisions should thus not be mistaken for conscious efforts at 
constitutional transformation.86 Indeed, I will argue in Part II that much of 
this institutional back-and-forth should be understood as subconstitutional 
institutional development that was critically enabled by textual rigidity. It 
should not, that is, be treated as a species of constitutional transformation 
that formally demanded a constitutional amendment.87  
 
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 304 (1803) (“It is admitted that Congress have the power to 
modify, increase or diminish the power of the courts and the judges. But that is a power totally 
different from the power to destroy the courts . . . .”). 
82 That case, of course, is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 363 (1857).  
83 See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERAL-
IST PERIOD, 1789–1801 (1997). For a specific example of important legislation in the early 
Congress with constitutional overtones, see the discussion of the removal power in Aziz Z. Huq, 
Removal as a Political Question, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 & n.33 (2013) [hereinafter Huq, Removal]. 
84 See Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change, 108 
YALE L.J. 1959, 1968-69 (1999). 
85 See id. at 1989 (“By threatening to destroy the Union, the crisis of 1800 forced politicians 
to acknowledge their mutual commitment to [the Constitution].”). 
86 Ongoing work by my colleague Alison LaCroix on the use of federal spending in the early 
Republic attests to the perceived binding force of the written Constitution, and the perceived 
need for Article V–mediated change to the text before the deployment of measures universally 
viewed as desirable.  
87 It is important to concede though, that the line between constitutional change and subcon-
stitutional institutional development is a contestable one, and I do not claim otherwise.  
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Only one extant scholarly model of informal constitutional change ad-
dresses events during the early Republic. This model focuses on legislated 
compromises between Northern and Southern states beginning with the 
1820 Missouri Compromise and ending with the 1854 Kansas–Nebraska Act. 
According to the model, each of these federal statutes promoted “sectional 
balance” by maintaining the equilibrium between slave and free states in the 
Senate.88 Sectional balance legislation, however, was not perceived at the 
time as amending the Constitution. Rather, it was understood as imple-
menting a principle that had been latent in the Constitution “from the 
beginning . . . in the projection of an equal number of new free and slave 
states in the territories in the 1780s.”89 Such legislation evinced loyalty to 
the original deal. The use of sectional balance legislation, therefore, is not 
evidence of successful amendment, but instead suggests that the rigidity 
and stability of the original constitutional deal played a role in promoting 
constitutional survival.  
In sum, informal amendment protocols, whether they rely on judicial 
decisions, framework statutes, or constitutional moments, can provide at 
best only a partial explanation of the Constitution’s longevity. In particular, 
they do a poor job of explaining constitutional survival in the parlous 
antebellum period where the Republic was at its most vulnerable.  
C.  The Normative Critique of Article V 
The positive puzzle of Article V has invited a suite of normative objec-
tions. If the provision is unusually rigid, then the range of possible amend-
ments will be functionally cabined to only “perfecting” measures90 that are 
relatively inconsequential.91 As a result, many commentators condemn 
Article V as “comatose”92 and functionally “irrelevan[t].”93 Two further lines 
 
88 See Barry R. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability (arguing that “[a]n additional 
institution . . . called sectional balance” was needed to provide “a static security for southerners 
and their property in slaves” (emphasis omitted)), in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 343, 357-58 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta 
Swedenborg eds., 2006) [hereinafter Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability]; ELKINS ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 83 (adopting the sectional balance argument). Weingast’s claim appears to be that 
these laws in effect changed the Constitution by adding a new element to the deal.  
89 Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 88, at 357.  
90 Hamburger, supra note 32, at 300-01. 
91 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007) (“A 
funny thing happened to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We have lost our 
ability to write down our new constitutional commitments in the old-fashioned way.”). 
92 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution?, 66 MICH. 
L. REV. 931, 931 (1968). 
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of criticism follow. The first focuses on Article V’s countermajoritarian 
effect. The second condemns Article V’s distributive consequences.  
Consider first the countermajoritarian critique. Many commentators 
claim that, “from both a historical and comparative perspective . . . Article 
V makes even the proposal of amendments by Congress too difficult.”94 
Inflexibility interposes the “dead hand”95 of past generations and prevents 
the realization of current preferences.96 The countermajoritarian critique 
focuses on Article V’s supermajoritarian character.97 By demanding extraor-
dinarily large coalitions at both the proposal and the ratification stages, 
Article V endows minorities with disproportionate power to block amend-
ment efforts by supermajoritian coalitions of more than seventy percent of 
the nation. A blocking minority, moreover, may reflect the interests and 
beliefs of a bygone political era that no longer commands majoritarian 
assent and yet is able to maintain disproportionate national influence. 
Rigidity has immediate costs insofar as it prevents correction of what some 
 
93 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 6, at 1460; accord Dixon, supra note 92, at 932 (questioning 
whether Article V has become “little more than a constitutional toy for occasional distraction and 
amusement”). 
94 Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, supra note 1, at 655; accord LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 165 (“Article V constitutes an iron cage with 
regard to changing some of the most important aspects of our political system.”); Griffin, supra 
note 2, at 173 (“Perhaps a supermajority of Congress should be sufficient to approve any amend-
ment.”); see also Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy (“Why should a 
constitutional framework, ratified two centuries ago, have such enormous power over our lives 
today?”), in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195 ( Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad 
eds., 1988) [hereinafter Holmes, Precommitment]. 
95 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 606, 609 (2008) (“Th[e] dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is 
feasible for the living to depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our 
generation participated in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the Constitution is 
otherwise imperfect for our time.”); see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1730 (“[O]ne 
important claim against following the original Constitution is that it permits the dead hand of the 
past to control the present.”). 
96 See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional En-
trenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 251-52 (1996) (developing a two-tiered approach 
to amendment that would address both democratic and constitutional inflexibility concerns); see 
also Levinson, Political Implications, supra note 63, at 123 (accepting the justification for entrench-
ment in some cases, such as the First Amendment, but also arguing that there are “no good 
reasons to support the formal stasis engendered by Article V” on other questions). It is important 
to note that constitutional binding is dissimilar to the kind of self-dealing of individuals (with the 
most famous example being Ulysses tying himself to the mast) inasmuch as the Founding 
generation and current generations are wholly different entities. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES 
UNBOUND 92 (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND] (exploring the “disanology 
between individual and collective self-binding”). 
97 Holmes, Precommitment, supra note 94, at 195 (“Why should a minority of our fellow citi-
zens be empowered to prevent amendments to the Constitution?”). 
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perceive as unjust or dysfunctional parts of the 1787 Constitution, such as 
the Senate’s apportionment rule, the ill-defined scope of executive power, 
and the use of life tenure for federal judges.98 These concerns have prompt-
ed proposals of an extratextual plebiscitary mechanism for fundamental 
change without supermajoritarian consent.99  
“Dead hand” criticism need not collapse into wholesale rejection of con-
stitutional entrenchment. Even an ardent majoritarian can in good con-
science endorse off-the-rack governance structures reduce the transaction 
costs of governing by eliminating each successive generation’s need to 
recreate basic democratic frameworks.100 A majoritarian might hence 
endorse the 1787 Constitution as an adequate if imperfect “blueprint for 
democratic governance,” in which there is some circulation of elected 
officeholders and as a framework that both reduces the risk of defection101 
and “discourage[s] frivolous attempts to revise the Constitution every time 
political deadlock occurs.”102 That is, endorsing majoritarianism is not the 
same as rejecting constitutionalism. Nevertheless, even if some constitu-
tional entrenchment is desirable, Article V may still go too far. After all, 
many other constitutions operate without its extreme rigidity. It is difficult 
to see why the United States needs so much more textual rigidity than other 
countries. 
A second line of criticism of Article V identifies a failure to accommo-
date specific constituencies in the amendment process. Hence, Article V is 
criticized both as being too friendly to the several states and as evincing 
 
98 See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 25-158 (exam-
ining these, and other, perceived flaws in the Constitution); accord ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW 
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 121-39 (2003) (developing arguments from 
democratic theory against current political structures). 
99 See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 8, at 457 (explaining that citizens have a legal 
right to amend the Constitution “via a majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national 
referendum, even though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article V”); see also Akhil 
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1043, 1044 (1988) (arguing for “constitutional amendment by direct appeal to, and ratification by, 
We the People of the United States”). 
100 See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIB-
ERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing constitutional rules to grammatical rules, which “do 
not merely restrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do many things they would not 
otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”). 
101 Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some 
Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003); see also Jon 
Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought (“The purpose of entrenched clauses . . . is to 
ensure a reasonable degree of stability in the political system and to protect minority rights.”), in 
CHOICE OVER TIME 35, 38 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) [hereinafter Elster, 
Intertemporal Choice]. 
102 HOLMES, supra note 100, at 155. 
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excessive hostility to local interests. On the one hand, Article V is con-
demned for allocating too large a role to the states qua political entities, in 
lieu of reflecting the preferences of citizens on a roughly per capita basis.103 
Given the peculiar political geography of the United States, this means a 
“large majority [must] dread and sometimes submit to constitutional 
innovations appealing only to a minority . . . .”104 On the other hand, a 
different set of critics allege that the national convention mechanism for 
proposing amendments is so “broken” that Congress maintains an “effective 
veto” on constitutional change and uses it exclusively to “promote amend-
ments that accord with its own preferences.”105 Another pro-federalism 
critique argues that Article V is flawed because it creates agency slack 
between the national electorate and its various representatives in federal 
and state governments.106 On the latter view, Congress’s de facto control 
over the constitutional amendment process pursuant to Article V may 
“expand[] the federal government and increas[e] Congress’ ability to extract 
rents and to redistribute wealth.”107 On this last view, it would seem that 
extensions of the franchise achieved by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments are not occasions for celebration, but are to be 
condemned as efforts to “provide[] a supply of votes to the enacting 
 
103 Writing in the early 1960s, Charles Black thus identified and condemned the possibility 
of a successful constitutional amendment being enacted with the support of a bare forty percent of 
the nation’s population. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threat-
ened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 959-60 (1963) (calculating the leverage that a group of states with 
relatively sparse populations could wield). 
104 Id. at 959. 
105 Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1512-13. The relationship between Article V and federalism 
values is, more generally, an important topic with a long historical trajectory. The leading 
historian of Article V, Kyvig, for example, argues that the supermajority rules of Article V 
“reflected the Founders’ vision of federalism” and the appropriate level of deference to states. 
KYVIG, supra note 27, at 471. Subsequent to ratification, the ardent states’ rights advocate John 
Calhoun then suggested that Article V would protect the South from Northern domination up to 
the point where secession would be required. See John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution 
and Government of the United States (asserting that “the amending power” resides with “the several 
states, in their original, distinct and sovereign character”), in A DISQUISITION ON GOVERN-
MENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 111, 158 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851). On this Calhounian view, Article V itself embodies 
a vindication of the correct federalism balance. 
106 See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analy-
sis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 162 (1993) (“[T]he Framers 
put the Constitution largely out of the reach of ‘factions’ . . . at the cost of depriving the 
majority of meaningful control over the content of the Constitution.”).  
107 Id. at 115; see also id. at 129-30 (arguing that “many of the amendments indirectly facilitat-
ed the institutional ability of Congress to serve as a source of rents”).  
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coalition” and thereby “increase[] the likelihood of redistribution of wealth 
through government.”108  
Criticism of Article V, however, is not universal. A handful of commen-
tators claim that because the Constitution’s original design is optimal, 
formal change ought to be as costly as possible.109 Taking constitutional 
perfection yet further, a number of commentators with widely divergent 
methodological and normative premises have proposed that Article V has in 
fact enabled an effective sorting of good, ratified amendments from undesir-
able, unratified amendments.110  
Neither of these two lines of defense, however, is in my view entirely 
successful.  In brief, both implicitly celebrate the net effect of the original 
 
108 Id. at 143. It is worth flagging that there are important normative objections to the cri-
tique described in the text.  
109 See, e.g., Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 581, 589 (1915) 
(“The constitution of the United States is justly regarded as the greatest instrument of govern-
ment ever ordained by man. For more than a century it stood almost unchanged . . . . The 
present mode of amendment assures its stability while permitting natural evolution.”); see also 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRACTICE 164 (2004) (arguing that “the Article V requirements for the amendment of 
the Constitution are an attractive part of the pragmatic, justice-seeking quality of our constitu-
tional institutions”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1720 (“[T]he rules for enacting and 
amending the United States Constitution are in large measure desirable . . . .”). These 
arguments for the Constitution’s optimality rest on the epistemic benefits of Article V’s superma-
joritarian character, id. at 1711-13 (invoking Condorcet’s jury theorem), and on the idea that Article 
V’s obduracy prompted the Framers to take into account the interests of subsequent generations, 
Sager, supra, at 164 (“The obduracy of the Constitution to amendment requires of members of the 
ratifying generation that they choose for the Constitution principles and provisions not just for 
themselves but for their children . . . .”). Neither of these arguments is persuasive, even putting 
aside the obvious flaws in the 1787 Constitution. First, it is not clear that the demanding 
conditions for Condorcetian epistemic advantage, in particular the assumption of uncorrelated 
errors, were in fact met in 1787. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: 
Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 286 (2001) (assuming in discussing 
the theorem that “each voter is more likely to choose the correct outcome than any other”). To the 
contrary, the intensive deliberations around the Constitution undermine any inference that the 
condition of independent errors was satisfied. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS 
OF REASON 30 (2009) (“[T]he basic reach of the Jury Theorem is not well understood . . . .”). 
In any case, because a 1787 supermajority is numerically smaller than a 2012 majority, Condorcet’s 
theorem favors the latter and not the former. Second, Sager’s argument in favor of Article V 
assumes that constitutional rigidity induced members of the founding generation to act in a 
benevolent way by taking into account the preferences of future generations. But Sager does not 
explain either how the founding generation could intuit what those preferences would be, or what 
induces a benevolent—as opposed to a condescending or hostile—view of future generations.  
110 This is an argument invoked by scholars at opposite poles of the political spectrum. Com-
pare Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (1998) (arguing 
that “most of the ratified amendments, by any measure, were desirable revisions”), with McGinnis 
& Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1724-28 (lauding Article V on the basis of some proposed amend-
ments that have failed).  
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1787 text and later constitutional amendments. But the original Constitution 
contained explicit protections for the slave trade and awarded representa-
tional subsidies based on states’ possession of slave populations.111 It should 
go without saying that no one today views those provisions as worthy of 
celebration. Just like the flawed 1787 baseline, the corpus of subsequent 
amendments is also of variable quality.112 For example, amendments now 
hymned for their emancipatory, democracy-promoting consequences may 
also have had the perverse collateral effect of strengthening other kinds of 
political exclusion.113 Other amendments now celebrated for rectifying 
errors in the 1787 Constitution failed for decades to have meaningful effect 
on the ground.114 Nor does the historical pattern of failed amendments, in 
my view, provide strong grounds for Whiggish enthusiasm. Among the 
failed amendments littering American history are proposals that today 
would likely be viewed by many—including presumably the commentators 
who praise Article V’s sorting effects—as desirable, including bans on child 
labor,115 equal rights for women,116 and the full enfranchisement of citizens 
residing in the District of Columbia.117 A normative defense of Article V 
grounded in current constitutional perfectionalism, in short, must rest on 
highly controversial normative and empirical judgments.118 It cannot be 
sustained without disputable assumptions about the wisdom of the founding 
generation and the precision of Article V as a sorting device.  
Article V, in sum, presents a puzzle. Constitutions tend to survive when 
they are flexible. Yet our Constitution is among both the world’s most rigid 
and also its oldest. This anomaly calls for explanation. The rigidity of 
 
111 See DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO 
RATIFICATION 3, 71-105 (2009) (noting six constitutional clauses that “directly” concern slavery, 
and five others known by the Framers to have important effects on slavery—all but one of which 
“protect[ed] slavery”). 
112 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1697 (taking a mixed view of the Constitution’s 
history and effectiveness). 
113 For example, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in a way that con-
firmed the exclusion of women from the mandatory franchise, and was understood to do so at the 
time. See Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1612-16 (2012) (discussing the enactment history of 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and noting that it “bitterly disappointed radicals”).  
114 The mere enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments did not redress the compound-
ing effects of slavery. For a recent account of this history, see DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, 
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACKS FROM THE CIVIL WAR 
TO WORLD WAR II (2009).  
115 J. Res. 13, 36th Cong., 12 Stat. 251 (1861).  
116 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).  
117 H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 3795 (1978).  
118 Cf. Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360 (1981) (arguing 
against claims that the Constitution supplies solutions to all emergent social problems). 
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Article V generates a host of trenchant normative critiques. To date, howev-
er, its defenders have failed to respond to those charges. They have failed to 
answer Patrick Henry’s prescient question: Why so much rigidity?  
II.  THE FUNCTION OF ARTICLE V IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
This Part proffers an answer to Part I’s puzzle by showing how Article 
V–induced rigidity could foster constitutional longevity. Drawing on recent 
economic literature about long-term contracting, this Part identifies two 
potential beneficial effects from textual inflexibility that promote the 
survival of the Constitution during the first few decades of its existence. I 
first advance two claims respecting the function of textual rigidity in a 
constitution. I then demonstrate that both plausibly characterize the early 
U.S. context. First, rigidity mitigates a potentially fatal ‘hold-up’ problem 
that can preclude constitutional ratification and discourage vital investments 
in the institutions necessary to implement a new constitution. Second, 
textual rigidity encourages post-ratification investments that catalyze a 
virtuous circle, yielding long-term anchoring effects.119 While I cannot 
conclusively demonstrate the causal significance of either of these mecha-
nisms, I aim here to establish their plausibility against the weight of conven-
tional criticism of Article V. 
Although my argument focuses on the first decades of the Constitution’s 
existence, it does not concern the original expectations of the Framers. That 
is, I do not claim that the Framers envisaged or intended the mechanism 
limned here. The drafting history of the Constitution, and indeed eight-
eenth-century political science more generally, evinced scant grasp of the 
“difficulties encountered in conceptualizing and modeling incomplete 
contracting . . . .”120 As Robert Dahl has nicely explained, “realistic and 
gifted as the [Framers] were, many of their key assumptions proved to be 
false, and the constitution they created has survived not because of their 
predictions but in spite of them.”121 My claim thus concerns actual rather 
than intended effects. To adapt Adam Ferguson’s dictum, our Constitution’s 
survival may be “the result of human action, but not the execution of any 
human design.”122  
 
119 To be clear, my claim is about the value of textual rigidity in the early life of a constitu-
tion. As Section III.C explains, rigidity is likely less desirable in later periods of constitutional 
development.  
120 Tirole, supra note 11, at 742. 
121 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 141 (1956). 
122 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 119 (Fania Oz-
Salzberger ed., 1995). 
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This Part first explains why it is appropriate to model the Constitution 
as an incomplete contract. It then introduces relevant concepts and findings 
from the literature on transaction costs in contracting over incomplete 
instruments. Finally, the remainder of this Part applies those concepts to 
the constitutional context. My aim in so doing is not to show a precise fit 
between private-law mechanisms and public-law dynamics. Rather, the 
extensive private-law literature serves as a launching point for specification 
of similar dynamics in the constitutional context. I conclude by offering 
evidence that the mechanisms described here in fact operated in the early 
Republican context.  
A.  The Constitution as a Long-Term Relational Contract 
There is ample literature analyzing constitutions as contracts.123 Because 
it yields at least two ways of modeling a constitution as a contract, I begin 
by clarifying which sort of model this Article will pursue. 
1.  Two Views of Constitutions as Contracts 
First, and most obviously, a constitution can be viewed as a contract be-
tween citizens and the state. This version of “constitution as contract” is, of 
course, familiar from normative political philosophy. For instance, John 
Locke famously identified the emergence of a “compact” through the 
agreement of citizens with the aim of “mutual preservation of . . . lives, 
liberties, and estates.”124 The Lockean view produces normative questions 
about the scope of authority delegated to the state and the rights reserved to 
 
123 See, e.g., ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 66-72 (making the analogy and drawing on the 
existing incomplete contracting literature); Stefan Voigt, Constitutional Political Economy: Analyzing 
Formal Institutions at the Most Elementary Level (explaining the various conceptualizations of the 
Constitution), in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 363, 367-68 (E. 
Brousseau & J. Glachant, eds., 2008); Sutter, supra note 13, at 139 (noting that “constitutional 
contracts are no different” from commercial contracts in the enforcement context); see also Aghion 
& Bolton, supra note 13, at 44-45 (discussing the problem of contractual incompleteness as it 
relates to the social contract). Another line of theoretical work focuses on the problems of “self-
enforcing constitutions,” but takes up essentially the same set of concerns and problems. See, e.g., 
Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic 
Stability in America’s First Century, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 278, 279 (2013) (discussing constitu-
tional stability for democracies with self-enforcing constitutions); Yadira González de Lara, Avner 
Greif & Saumitra Jha, The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 105, 105 (2008) (describing the rule of law in the West as an example of “equilibria with 
administrators sufficiently powerful to constrain rules”).  
124 John Locke, The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of 
Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 100, 155 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).  
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the people. It is less useful as a heuristic for understanding constitutional 
stability because it is not the people per se that pose a threat to constitu-
tional stability. With the rare exception of instances of massive popular 
unrest, it is not generally the people as an undifferentiated whole that 
imperil constitutional survive.125 Rather, “[o]rdinary people often play a 
peripheral role in the breakdown of democracy.”126 A heterogeneous and 
geographically diffuse population will rarely be able to challenge the state in 
the absence of intermediating institutions such as political parties or ethnic 
or religious organizations.127 Hence, I do not pursue this mode of constitu-
tional analysis any further here.  
Instead, this Article builds upon the second model of the constitution-
as-contract. This second model focuses not on the relationship between the 
people and the state, but instead on the interactions between the various 
major interest groups that compete for state power. In this model, a written 
constitution can be understood as a contract between those diverse powerful 
parties—be they states (as in the U.S. context), economically powerful 
interest groups, or even tribes or ethnic groupings—whose cooperation is 
necessary to establish a long-term cooperative relationship and to enable 
mutually beneficial cooperative action. Because it focuses explicitly on the 
most common causes of constitutional death, this model provides the more 
salient lens for analyzing problems of constitutional survival. As a result, 
this framework for analyzing constitutional rules and provisions has been 
employed successfully to explain, for example, the rise of judicial review in 
certain Asian countries as a form of “insurance” for both “prospective 
governing parties” and “prospective opposition parties” that alike feared 
permanent lockout of government after electoral defeat.128 My aim is to 
extend the model to the early American context and to blend it with 
insights from the literature on incomplete contacting. 
 
125 Contra the argument in the text, some political theorists have argued that regimes can be 
deposed through unmediated popular action. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 48 
(1965) (identifying at least the start of the 1789 French revolution with a “multitude on their 
march . . . the multitude of the poor and the downtrodden, who every century had been hidden 
in darkness and shame”). Another example of a populist revolt, less well recalled today, is the 
French Commune of 1871; for a concise history, see ALISTAIR HORNE, THE TERRIBLE YEAR: 
THE PARIS COMMUNE, 1871 (1971).  
126 NANCY BERMEO, ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: THE CITIZEN-
RY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY 19-20 (2003). 
127 This basic collective action problem is identified in MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 34 (1965). 
128 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 25 (2003).  
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In short, this Article conceptualizes the U.S. Constitution as a deal be-
tween powerful interest groups rather than as a product of popular sover-
eignty. I take this approach not because the latter approach is normatively 
disreputable or irrelevant, but rather because the latter approach does not 
capture the dynamics most relevant to constitutional demise. In addition, I 
do not provide a precise algorithm for determining which interest groups 
are salient to the analysis in the U.S. context. Instead, it suffices to note that 
organized groups are relevant insofar as their agreement in an original 
constitutional deal is necessary for an ensuing regime to be resilient against 
significant shocks. In the American context, for example, these groups 
obviously included the thirteen states as well as economically powerful 
interest groups, such as commercial creditors, merchants, and slavehold-
ers.129 Despite the absence of textual language respecting secession, states 
had the de facto power to threaten exit from the Union, as the events of the 
1860s amply show.130 My focus is on the question of how the Constitution 
induced stability by encouraging all necessary parties to enter the initial 
constitutional deal, and then by dissuading them from exiting during the 
acutely vulnerable first two decades of the early Republic.131  
Viewing the Constitution as a contract reveals two important qualities 
about the document. First, a constitution qua contract has a long-term, 
relational quality in that it involves not merely an instantaneous exchange 
(such as one sees on spot markets for commodities), but also the making of 
durable cooperative interactions by all parties to create a contractual 
 
129 See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 19-51 (1913) (cataloguing “economic interests” active in the 
Founding period, and including slaveholders, creditors, and the “innumerable manufacturing, 
shipping, trading, and commercial interests”).  
130 There are expressive reasons not to include a textual right of secession that I do not ad-
dress here. See MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, PETER C. ORDESHOOK & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGN-
ING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 105 (2004) 
(“A formally recognized right to secede . . . legitimizes the view that the existing union can be 
dissolved and recreated on new terms . . . .”). 
131 This model glosses over a number of important problems. First, it applies a model of 
individual precommitment to collectivities (such as states and interest groups) that have diverse 
degrees of internal organization and formal decisional capacity. Cf. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your 
Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1751, 1758-60 (2003) [hereinafter Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge] (“[I]ndividual and collective 
decisions use different precommitment devices.”). Second, it ignores the fact that the composition 
of a state’s population changes over time, such that a constitution-as-contract eventually binds a 
class of persons who were not alive at the point of contracting. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UN-
BOUND, supra note 96, at 98 (discussing the “quasi-constitutional” impact of legislation regarding 
constitutional conventions). To the extent I am concerned here with the first two generations after 
the Constitution’s ratification, the second problem may be mitigated.  
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surplus.132 Second, the constitution qua contract is incomplete in that the 
contracting parties have not written down contractual solutions to all 
possible future contingencies.133 Incompleteness exists for several reasons. A 
threshold reason is the high cost of imagining and resolving all possible 
contingencies in a single document.134 In the constitutional context especial-
ly, it is impossible for drafters, who have limited time and political capital, 
and to anticipate all possible future states of the world, let alone to provide 
comprehensive and unambiguous governance solutions for them.135 Both the 
“cost of processing and using . . . information” about potential states of 
the world and “the cost of writing a contingent [contract] clause in a 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous way that it can be enforced”136 ensure 
that most contracts are in some measure incomplete. Further, even with 
unlimited time and political capital, bounded rationality would prevent 
drafters from complete specification within a constitution-as-contract.137  
 
132 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts (discussing possible definitions of “relation-
al contract”), in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 291, 291-96 ( J ack Beatson & 
Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic 
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 860 
n.21 (1978) (coining the term “relational contract”). 
133 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299 (2004) 
[hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS] (“An aspect of contractual practice . . . is that contracts 
are significantly incomplete . . . [because they] omit all manner of variables and contingencies 
that are of potential relevance to contracting parties.”). Tirole argues that “there is unfortunately 
no clear definition of ‘incomplete contracting’ in the literature,” but assumes a set of restrictions 
on the standard model of contracts based on unforeseen contingencies, the cost of contract 
drafting, and the cost of enforcement. Tirole, supra note 11, at 743-44. 
134 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 70 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (“[F]or long-term contracts executed under conditions of uncertain-
ty, complete presentation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible.”); accord SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 299 (noting the same); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
691, 696 (1986) (hypothesizing “a situation in which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and 
describe unambiguously in advance how all the potentially relevant aspects of the production 
allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states of the world”). In addition to the 
reasons for incompleteness listed above, Shavell also discusses enforcement costs and the 
impossibility of judicial verification. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 300. Because 
those grounds are not relevant to my analysis, I do not address them here. 
135 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 70 (“[N]ot all future 
contingencies for which adaptations are required can be anticipated at the outset.”). 
136 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 
755, 756 (1988) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation]. 
137 Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration (“Contracts may be incomplete . . . because of 
‘bounded rationality’ that makes it unlikely that the transacting parties can foresee all possible 
contingencies . . . .”), in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 319, 322 
(Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) [hereinafter Joskow, Vertical Integration]. 
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The relational quality and the incompleteness of a constitution-as-
contract are intertwined. As the expected duration and complexity of the 
relations underpinning a constitution increase, the costs of writing down ex 
ante solutions for all future contingencies rise, if only because the range of 
contingencies grows as a constitution’s expected lifespan increases.138 A basic 
insight of this contracting literature is therefore that there is a “trade-off 
between rigidity and flexibility” analogous to that which exists in constitu-
tional design between the benefits of specification and the gains from 
adaption.139 
2.  The Hold-up Problem in Private Contracting 
A large law and economics literature about barriers to contracting pur-
sues Ronald Coase’s famous question why contracting parties opt to inter-
nalize a transaction within a firm rather than using the market.140 Coase’s 
analysis identified a comparison of the marginal “costs of organizing” 
production inside and outside the firm as pivotal to this decision.141 When 
the costs of organizing through market mechanisms are relatively high, it is 
worth fashioning a long-term and incomplete relational contract—that is, 
the firm. Coase’s insight generated a range of hypotheses about how incom-
plete, relational contracts can be designed to address problems specific to 
particular industries and parties.142 His analysis pointed toward different 
ways in which contracts could respond to heterogeneous barriers to 
 
138 Some commentators go so far as to define relational contracts in terms of their incom-
pleteness. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (“A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of 
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”). 
139 Compare Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 
(2008) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Contracts as Reference Points] (discussing the difficulties of using 
overly specific contracts to combat the problems of incompleteness), with Elster, Intertemporal 
Choice, supra note 101, at 43 (identifying the need to find “an optimal balance between stability and 
rigidity” in constitutional design); accord Ferejohn, supra note 44, at 502 (“The issue of constitu-
tional change—indeed the problem of constitutionalism generally—centers on how changeable a 
people’s constitution ought to be.”).  
140 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6-7 (1988) (discussing the 
new concept introduced in his article, The Nature of the Firm).  
141 See id. at 7 (identifying the decision as a comparison of the costs of organizing a firm and 
the market transaction costs). 
142 See Pierre Garrouste & Stéphane Saussier, The Theories of the Firm, in BROUSSEAU & 
GLACHANT, supra note 123, at 23-24 (exploring the “competing theories of the firm” developed 
after Coase); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 79, fig.3-2 (illustrat-
ing the efficient matching of government structures with different types of transactions). 
  
2014] The Function of Article V 1197 
 
contracting,143 including adverse selection problems, information asymme-
tries,144 and the need for high-powered rather than low-powered incentives 
to make a contract succeed.145  
The problem of “hold-ups,”146 otherwise known as the problem of “post-
contractual opportunistic behavior,”147 has special relevance for understand-
ing the role of textual rigidity in constitutions qua contracts. Hold-up 
problems can arise whenever parties must make post-contractual invest-
ments in assets specific to their relationship.148 An investment-backed asset 
is specific when a contracting party’s next-best return from the asset is 
substantially less than the return from the asset within the context of the 
contractual relationship.149 For example, imagine a printing press built with 
specifications for a particular newspaper that generates a joint annual 
surplus of $1.5 million, where the next-best use of the press (for a different 
publisher with different needs) would yield only $500,000.150 Once the press 
has made its investment, the newspaper can threaten to breach in order to 
extort a greater share of the jointly produced surplus from the investing 
party.151 Because the second-best use of the asset pays out much less to the 
investing party, the latter stands to realize a large loss by walking away from 
 
143 For an early survey of barriers to contracting, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical 
Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114-22 (1971) 
(listing five species of market failures that “involve transaction costs that can be attenuated by 
substituting internal organization for market exchange”). 
144 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 81-83 (discussing the 
problems of information asymmetry both ex ante and at the contract execution stage). 
145 Garrouste & Saussier, supra note 142, at 28.  
146 See SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 298-99 (discussing a range of hold-up 
problems that result in socially suboptimal behavior); see also Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and 
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 439-41 (1976) (describing the hold-up problem as 
one of providing protection for the “right to be served”). 
147 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropria-
ble Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297-98 (1978).  
148 Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 322 (concluding that these situations lead to 
bargaining over ex post quasi-rents). Williamson uses the phrase “asset specificity.” WILLIAM-
SON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 52-56.  
149 See Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 322 (“[R]elationship-specific investments 
are investments which, once made, have a value in alternative uses that is less than the value in the 
use originally intended to support a specific trading relationship.”). 
150 This example is loosely adapted from Klein et al., supra note 147, at 298-300. 
151 Another way of stating the problem is that “one party to a contract agrees to a proposed 
modification either because of expected dire consequences should that party not agree to the 
modification or because the available remedies for breach by the other party are inadequate to 
deter breach by the other party.” See Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: 
An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1989). The 
potential breaching party, Williamson argues, is distinct from an ordinary contracting party in that 
she displays “opportunism,” or “self-interest seeking with guile.” WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 47.  
  
1198 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1165 
 
the contract. Accordingly, it is rational to accede to renegotiation.152 Even 
when the dependency is bilateral, the possibility of hold-up can still lead to 
haggling that dissipates gains from trade.153  
The potential for hold-up has both ex ante and ex post effects. Ex ante, a 
potential investing party will rationally anticipate the possibility of hold-up 
and so decline to enter into contracts where that risk exists.154 Otherwise 
Pareto-superior deals will, as a result, remain unrealized. Ex post, parties 
that do enter deals will dissipate resources on both hold-ups and resistance 
to hold-ups, resulting in intracontractual disputes and haggling that expend 
resources without commensurate social gain.155 Solving the hold-up problem 
is valuable, therefore, because it enables otherwise Pareto-superior deals to 
be negotiated and honored in ways that maximize their value. 
The relationship-specificity of assets created by post-contractual invest-
ment and the consequent specter of a hold-up can be observed across the 
landscape of private contracting.156 Consider, for example, a coal-burning 
power generation facility that benefits from being located at the “mouth” of 
a mine, but that thereby renders itself vulnerable to hold-up.157 Or think of 
an automobile manufacturer that may wish for a subsidiary supplier to 
invest in specialized manufacturing hardware, and even to co-locate, in 
order to minimize production costs, only to find that the supplier baulks out 
of a fear of hold-up.158 It is even possible to find hold-ups in contracts over 
 
152 I assume here a one-shot interaction. Repeat-play circumstances may render other strate-
gies rational.  
153 Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 327 ( f inding that these losses from haggling 
drive the “choice of governance structure”). 
154 See Jolls, supra note 12, at 208 (reasoning that the possibility of hold-up will either lead to 
no contract or to underinvestment). 
155 Id. at 207-08 (exploring how hold-ups are “welfare-reducing”); see also Klein et al., supra 
note 147, at 301 (“Even if transactors are risk neutral, the presence of possible opportunistic 
behavior will entail costs as real resources are devoted to the attempt to improve posttransaction 
bargaining positions in the event . . . opportunism occurs.”).  
156 See Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts (“Much 
economic activity takes place within long-term, complex, perhaps multiparty contractual (or 
contract-like) relationships; behavior is, in varying degrees, sheltered from market forces.”), in 
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 16, 16 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989).  
157 See Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning 
Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 38 (1985) (identifying that the transaction-
specific nature of an investment makes it particularly vulnerable to hold-ups). 
158 See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 147, at 308-10 (discussing the purchase of Fisher Body by 
General Motors). For an important challenge to the conventional account of this purchase, see 
Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 30 (2003) (arguing that “the 
integration of Fisher and Chevrolet took place before acquisition” and that GM's acquisition of 
Fisher Body in 1926 was not the main event . . . [and] the acquisition may have had almost no 
effect on the way in which Chevrolet interacted with Fisher at the plant level”). 
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human capital. A famous example involves the tough bargaining by actor 
James Gandolfini over whether he would appear in later seasons of the 
lucrative HBO series The Sopranos, which resulted in the actor roughly 
doubling his $400,000 per episode salary—the network being the object of 
the putative hold-up.159 As these examples suggest, an investment’s specifici-
ty can take many forms, from location to physical design or human capital 
allocations.160 The hold-up problem may be also especially acute in circum-
stances in which a post–contract formation investment is cooperative in 
nature in that it “generate[s] a direct benefit for the trading partner.”161 
Such cooperative investments are “critically important in modern manufac-
turing.”162 Empirical studies confirm that the hold-up problem is not merely 
hypothetical, but has significant effects in observed contracting contexts.163  
Hold-up problems arise in both incomplete and complete contracts, al-
beit in different ways. Hold-up can arise either when an incomplete contract 
does not address an unexpected exogenous event that provokes one party to 
seek renegotiation, or when post-contracting investments expose one party 
to another’s opportunism. With a complete contract, changed circumstances 
can also lead to hold-up.164 For instance, Gandolfini’s contract was likely 
complete in the sense that it specified a salary.165 The latter dispute can 
hence be described either in terms of an incomplete or a complete contract; 
it either concerned the breach of a complete contract followed by de novo 
deal-making (from HBO’s perspective), or the modification of an incom-
plete contract that did not state when modifications were permitted in light 
of changed circumstances (from Gandolfini’s perspective). The problem can 
accordingly be framed either as one of contractual commitment or gap-
filling. For the purposes of this Article, there is little need to distinguish 
 
159 Shavell, supra note 17, at 328. 
160 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 95-96 (delineating the 
different types as site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated 
assets). 
161 Che & Hausch, supra note 20, at 126; cf. Tirole, supra note 11, at 747 (“Roughly speaking, 
an investment is cooperative if it affects the trading partner’s surplus more than the investing 
party’s surplus.”).  
162 Che & Hausch, supra note 20, at 127. 
163 One study of a large naval construction contract found that “overall organization costs 
represent about 14 percent of the total costs for the components and activities” studied. Scott E. 
Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. & Edward A. Snyder, The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
2 (1991).  
164 For an analysis that identifies the need for mechanisms to generate enduring commit-
ments even in the absence of incompleteness, see Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: 
Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 537-38 (1983). 
165 The cases discussed infra note 178 might also be characterized as concerning complete 
contracts. 
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between these two characterizations, even if the distinction has significance 
in the private contracting context.166 
There are several ways of mitigating the potential for hold-ups, not all 
of which translate well into the public-law context. Among the first solu-
tions to be identified in the law and economics literature involved vertical 
integration. One firm would purchase the other and thereby eliminate the 
possibility of interfirm hold-up.167 Arranging deals within the firm, although 
it mitigates the hold-up problem, is not costless. Rather, it “sacrifices the 
high-powered incentive advantages of market exchange and, consequently, 
demands greater investments in monitoring and administration.”168 Some 
evidence nevertheless suggests that integration “becomes more likely in the 
presence of relationship-specific human capital . . . .”169 However promising 
it may be as a private-law solution, vertical integration cannot be transposed 
easily to the public-law context. A constitution cannot by mere ipse dixit 
dissolve a diverse and conflictive pool of interest groups into a harmonious 
whole.  
A second possible solution is to draft the contract to include one of the 
rather complex mechanisms economists have identified that dampen 
renegotiation.170 For example, a leading analysis postulates that in some 
circumstances, mechanisms for verifiable communication between parties 
 
166 I am grateful to Tony Casey for helpful discussions on this point. 
167 The seminal paper in this literature is Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: 
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979). For development of the 
idea, see WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 90; Sanford J. Grossman 
& Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 
94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986) (exploring vertical integration and explaining that “the owner 
of an asset” is defined as the party with “the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not 
been explicitly given away by contract”); accord Klein et al., supra note 148, at 302-07 (describing 
long-term contracting as the “primary alternative to vertical integration as a solution to the 
general problem of opportunistic behavior”). Note that the hold-up problem may be displaced 
rather than solved by vertical integration because it will sometimes be the case that the purchased 
firm’s managers have unique knowledge, and can therefore engage in a hold up of the purchasing 
firms management. See id. at 302-03 (describing the phenomenon as involving the failure to 
vertically integrate the employee’s human capital).  
168 Masten et al., supra note 163, at 6. 
169 Id. at 21. 
170 For a survey of potential solutions in the contract literature, see Philippe Aghion & Pat-
rick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 
481-90 (1992); Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal 
Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 480-81 (1996); and Richard Holden & Anup Malani, 
Contracts Versus Assets and the Boundary of the Firm (draft Jan, 2012) (on file with author). Maximiz-
ing efficiency may also be framed as a question of determining “[t]he optimal ownership structure 
. . . to minimize the overall loss in surplus due to investment distortions.” Grossman & Hart, 
supra note 167, at 710.  
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will enable the maintenance of efficient investment levels.171 Like vertical 
integration, the specific contractual solutions proposed in this line of 
analysis do not translate easily into the context of constitutions as con-
tract.172 An exception is the possibility of “offering to the potential cheater a 
future ‘premium,’ more precisely, a price sufficiently greater than average 
variable (that is, avoidable) cost to assure a quasi-rent stream that will 
exceed the potential gain from cheating.”173 Examples of the latter mecha-
nism include long-term implicit contracts with particular suppliers and 
interfirm reciprocity agreements. Both solutions create an enduring stream 
of benefits, the present-discounted value of which is greater than the 
benefits from cheating.174 As explained below, something akin to this 
mechanism might be discerned in the American constitutional domain, with 
the public-law context providing easier ways of generating the solution. 
The third solution to hold-ups explored in the private-law literature 
does, however, bear directly on public-law problems. Indeed, this solution 
may paradoxically be easier to employ in the public-law context than in the 
original private-law context. This is the possibility of simply declining to 
enforce any modifications to a contract.175 For example, after two parties 
sign a contract that requires relationship-specific investments on the part of 
party A, the court asked to enforce a modification of the contract elicited by 
party B will demur. Instead, it will enforce the terms of the contract as 
originally drafted. A rule against modification of this kind “assures prospec-
tive contract parties that signing a contract is not stepping into a trap,” and 
thereby enables Pareto-superior deals.176  
In practice, the effect of no-modification clauses under American con-
tract law is unclear. The “pre-existing duty rule” sometimes has the effect of 
barring certain sorts of modifications. It hence mitigates certain hold-up 
 
171 See Hart & Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, supra note 136, at 776 (noting 
that this solution is not available if parties are risk neutral).  
172 Independently, Shavell notes that “[t]he use of such contractually specified mechanisms 
does not . . . appear to be very important in reality,” although no evidence is supplied on this 
point. Shavell, supra note 17, at 348. 
173 Klein et al., supra note 148, at 304. 
174 Id. at 304-05. 
175 See Graham & Peirce, supra note 151, at 9-10 (noting the risk of hold-up as a justification 
for judicial nonenforcement of a contract). For early treatments of the possibility, see Varouj A. 
Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock & Michael Penny, The Law of Contract of Modifications: The 
Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173, 175 (1984); 
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 529-30 
(1981).  
176 Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
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problems.177 For example, in Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, a contract law 
casebook staple, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enforce a 
salary-increasing modification negotiated by the crew of a fishing vessel in 
the midst of an Alaska salmon run, at a time at which no substitute crew 
could possibly be found.178  
In other instances, however, “courts simply ignor[e] the pre-existing 
duty rule” or find ways to circumvent it.179 “Freedom of contract” principles 
are often cited as ground for such refusals.180 Even more problematic is the 
fact that “[t]hose who make a contract may unmake it . . . . Whenever two 
men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract 
again.”181 In other words, there is a generally available mechanism for 
rendering no-modification clauses nugatory—by entering into a side-
contract that counteracts the precise terms of an existing contract.182 These 
difficulties have provoked arguments for adopting a more formal rule in 
favor of the “enforcement of contractual terms constraining modifica-
tions.”183  
If no-modification clauses resolve a hold-up problem that can arise in 
private law contracting (both for incomplete and complete contracts), can 
they be employed to address analogous concerns in the public-law context? 
An alternative answer is developed in the next Section. But as a threshold 
matter, notice a key difference between the private and public-law contexts. 
In the private-law context, courts are unwilling to enforce no-modification 
clauses and it is hard to prevent parties from contracting around the clause 
via a new, offsetting contract. But a defining feature of the constitutional 
 
177 See CORBIN, supra note 17, at 105 (“[N]either the performance of duty nor the promise to 
render a performance already required by duty is a sufficient consideration for a return promise.”). 
The Uniform Commerce Code allows good faith modifications. U.C.C. §2-209(1) & cmt. 1 (1987). 
178 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1902); see also Lingenfelder v. 
Wainwright Brewing Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891) (voiding an architect’s contract because it 
was secured through threatening hold-up of a time-sensitive project); Rose v. Daniels, 8 R.I. 381, 
384 (1866) (voiding an agreement to accept part of a debt for lack of consideration). Other 
examples of pre-existing duty rules include admiralty rules for salvage, see Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 150, 150 (1856), and utility regulations, see Goldberg, supra note 156, at 18. Since Alaska 
Packers concerned a fixed term (salary), it might be characterized as a case about enforcement 
simpliciter. But note that from the crew’s perspective, the case concerned an incomplete term—
specifically the conditions for modification. 
179 Graham & Pierce, supra note 151, at 15. 
180 For an exemplary statement of freedom of contracting, see, e.g., Cont’l Basketball Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Ellenstein Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. 1996) (noting a “very strong presump-
tion of enforceability of contracts that represent the freely bargained agreement of the parties”). 
181 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.). 
182 Jolls observes that it is possible in some contexts to prevent side-contracting. Jolls, supra 
note 12, at 230-31.  
183 Id. at 236. 
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context is the absence of effective third-party enforcement.184 Supreme 
Courts and their ilk, after all, are “a product of constitutional negotiation,” 
rather than being extrinsic to the constitutional order.185 It is the parties 
themselves who must necessarily make the decision whether or not to 
comply with a constitution, seek amendment, or withdraw. Unlike in the 
private-law context, no-modification clauses in the public-law context can 
effectively take an option (modification) off the table. The parties are 
moved by such a clause from a three-option situation (adhere to the con-
tract, modify, or exit) to a two-option world (adherence or exit). As a 
consequence, one of the primary defects of no-modification clauses does not 
carry over from the private-law context to the public-law domain. 
It is also worth noting that no-modification clauses in private contracts 
are perceived as having nontrivial collateral costs. An across-the-board rule 
of contractual inflexibility might have benefits, but it also impedes other-
wise warranted adjustments in light of changed circumstances. As a result, 
proposals to enforce no-modification rules often incorporate an exception 
for contractual responses to unanticipated and exogenous changes in 
circumstances.186 Some long-term contracts already attempt to draw a 
distinction between desirable and undesirable modifications. For example, 
both “prime plus” clauses in loan agreements and “price protection” clauses 
with pari passu effect in supply contracts essentially operate as sorting 
devices to allow some desirable forms of change while preventing undesira-
ble forms of change that are more likely to be motivated by hold-ups.187  
In sum, an extensive literature concerning private contracting has iden-
tified a spectrum of transaction costs that impede the formation or con-
summate execution of durational contracts. An important strand of that 
literature identifies the risk of hold-up: the exploitation of parties who have 
invested in relationship-specific assets that lock them into a contract. 
Among the solutions offered in the literature is the possibility of no-
modification clauses. While there are reasons these are not (yet) common in 
ordinary contracting, those reasons do not translate well into the public law 
context.  
 
184 See Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge, supra note 131, at 1759-60 (contrasting the ability of an 
individual to enlist others in helping them achieve an objective with that of a society). 
185 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 72. 
186 See Jolls, supra note 12, at 228-30. 
187 See Klein, supra note 148, at 317 (explaining the mechanism and purpose of these clauses). 
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B.  The Role of Textual Rigidity in Promoting Constitutional Survival 
The foregoing discussion sets the stage for an account of the causal 
mechanism that may link constitutional rigidity to constitutional survival. 
Succinctly stated, the mechanism works as follows: in conditions in which 
cooperative investments are pivotal to the survival of a new constitutional 
order, a well-crafted constitution might plausibly be written with an onerous 
amendment rule akin to Article V. This amendatory provision operates 
much like a no-modification rule in ordinary contracting: it switches the 
parties’ choice set from three options—adhere to the contract, modify, or 
exit—to two—adherence or exit. This change elicits parties’ entrance to the 
constitution as contract ex ante, and then ex post renders more likely 
cooperative investments that otherwise would be put on hold or rationed for 
fear of hold-ups.  
We can take the analysis one step further. Notice that textual rigidity 
takes the “modify” option off the table but not the “exit” option. Indeed, as 
in the private law context, it is hard to see how the exit option could be 
effectively eliminated absent the threat of violence or coercion. And yet, 
even in the absence of coercion, it is possible that textual rigidity may also 
mitigate the risk of outright exit from the constitutional order. Rigidity 
indirectly addresses the risk of exit by eliciting cooperative investments 
from multiple parties toward the creation of new institutions that are in 
some fashion tied to the new constitution. That is, these investments are not 
portable. The costs sunk by those parties into cooperatively produced 
institutions have the effect of raising the stakes of departure from this new 
constitutional order. By making exit more costly, rigidity makes it less 
likely. Threats of defection also become less credible. The overall effect of 
textual rigidity not only addresses fears of midstream hold-up by opportun-
istic contracting partners but also elicits an entangling web of mutually 
beneficial cooperative investments that enmeshes all parties into a specific 
constitutional regime.  
I analyze this causal mechanism in its two stages. First, I look more 
closely at the link between constitutional rigidity and the hold-up problem. 
In the course of the argument, I point to evidence that this mechanism 
operated in the early American republic. Second, I look at the link between 
entangling institutions and constitutional survival. Again, I offer examples 
of specific institutions that may have played this role in the decades imme-
diately following ratification, which is when rigidity had its greatest utility.  
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1. The Preconditions for Constitutional No-Modification Rules 
If textual rigidity can mitigate the risk of ex ante failure to enter a Pare-
to-superior private contract and the risk of ex post underinvestment in the 
coproduction of goods under the contract, might the same mechanism work 
at the constitutional level? A threshold step in answering this question is to 
identify the circumstances under which hold-up is likely to be a problem, 
and to ascertain whether the U.S. Constitution falls within this class of 
cases.  
The problem of hold-up in a new constitutional context is likely to arise 
only when two preconditions are met: there is both oligopolistic political 
competition and a thin national institutional infrastructure. First, constitu-
tions installed in the absence of political competition pose no hold-up 
concern. Thus, a constitution imposed by dint of external military force,188 
or by a single monopolistic political party,189 need not be drafted with the 
risk of hold-up in mind. Second, drafters may rightly be less concerned 
about hold-up when robust national institutions already exist. This is 
because the latter vitiate the need for new, post-ratification cooperative 
investments.190 Given these possibilities, not every founding father or 
mother should be worried about the hold-up problem. Indeed, in many 
constitution-making scenarios, it will be quite likely that one of these 
preconditions for textual rigidity will not be met. The absence of other 
rigid, long-lasting constitutions, identified by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Mel-
ton, arguably suggests that these two conditions are rarely satisfied simulta-
neously.191  
The period of the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution, 
however, was characterized by both oligopolistic political competition and a 
thin national institutional infrastructure. First, the coalition in favor of more 
robust federal action viewed the several states as spoilers of the cooperative 
enterprise of maintaining independence from European domination and 
achieving economic prosperity.192 Prior to the Philadelphia Convention, 
states had notoriously refused the Confederation Congress’s fiscal and 
 
188 See Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 859 (2005) (citing 
post-war Japan and Germany as examples). 
189 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 173-74 (detailing the successful single handed control 
of Taiwan’s constitutional process by the KMT in the 1950s). 
190 The Constitutions of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics likely fall into this class. Id. 
at 170-71. 
191 Id. at 152. 
192 A concern with hold-up also implies some stable identification of group interest, such as a 
system of states (as in the U.S. context) or political parties. I focus in this passage on states. I am 
grateful to Mark Graber for pressing this point.  
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military requests despite the grave financial strains imposed by the Revolu-
tionary War.193 As early as 1782, Rhode Island had signaled that it would 
decline to ratify a proposed five-percent impost on imported goods.194 In 
1786, New Jersey and New York also indicated their unwillingness to 
continue contributing to the confederated fisc.195 Internal divisions in 
Congress also induced an “inability” on the national legislature’s part “to 
frame and implement satisfactory foreign policies,” leaving states vulnerable 
to the maneuvers of greater European powers.196  
A concern with states as potential spoilers was also reflected in the con-
cessions made to states that were implicitly or explicitly threatening exit 
from the federal project during drafting and ratification. During the 
Philadelphia Convention, for example, small states resisted any deviation 
from the Articles of Confederation rule of equal representation for each 
state.197 One result of this pressure was the “Great Compromise,” involving 
different apportionment rules for the House and the Senate.198 During 
ratification, the Constitution’s supporters also evinced concern that pivotal 
states would decline to accede to the new document, imperiling the entire 
exercise.199 That these concerns were powerful enough to alter the views of 
Madison and others on the desirability of a bill of rights suggests that some 
of the Framers had substantial concerns about defection from the national 
process.200  
The Framers’ obvious concerns about states’ exit from the Constitution 
creates a puzzle: why did they not expressly bar secession in the text of the 
 
193 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1996) (noting the fiscal crisis). The problem arose as a result of 
the depreciation of the Continental currency that was “Weimar-like in its rapidity and complete-
ness.” DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING 116 (2003). 
194 See RAKOVE, supra note 193, at 25. 
195 Id. at 31-32. 
196 See id. at 26-27 (discussing Spain’s closure of New Orleans and the lower Mississippi 
River to Americans in April 1784); see also Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 611, 618 (1999) (“[M]any of the Union's problems related in one way or another to its 
inability to present a credible threat of force.”). 
197 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 56 (1913) (noting that the Delaware delegation was instructed that state equality was non-
negotiable). 
198 Id. at 104-05. 
199 This is a dominant theme in the canonical account of ratification offered by Pauline 
Maier. MAIER, supra note 36. 
200 Nor would the problem of managing states’ rights end in 1789. Cf. Henry Paul Mona-
ghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 748 (2010) (“The history of ‘Our 
Federalism’ from 1789 to 1865 (and beyond) is the history of the impact of the centrifugal effects 
of sectionalism on the emerging American national polity.” ( footnote and citation omitted)). 
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Constitution? Not only was the Constitution silent on that point, but 
through the antebellum period there was a “lively and inconclusive debate 
over whether the Constitution permitted states to secede.”201 The argument 
developed in this Part offers a post hoc functional justification for this 
silence: the Framers did not need to rely on “parchment” prohibitions to 
attain structural design goals.202 Instead, institutional design might have 
generated the appropriate incentives and produced a stable equilibrium. 
Reliance on textual rigidity to deter secession thus coheres with the indi-
rect, structural strategies deployed elsewhere in the Constitution to mitigate 
systemic risks. 
Second, the several states, as of 1787, hardly had the robust national insti-
tutions of the kind then observed in Europe. To the contrary, a central aim 
of the new Constitution was the creation of national institutions backed by 
cooperative investments that would produce much-needed public goods in 
greater quantities than the Articles of Confederation. Hence, in describing 
the impulse for a new constitutional framework James Madison diagnosed a 
“[w]ant of concert in matters where common interest requires it” in the pre-
1787 confederation, a “defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state of our 
commercial affairs.”203 He attributed this lacuna to “the perverseness of 
particular States whose concurrence is necessary.”204 States’ opportunism, 
Madison suggested, induced a dearth of cooperative investments in national 
institutions with public-good characteristics.  
Consistent with Madison’s concerns, members of the Philadelphia Con-
vention arrived with the shared “recogn[ition] that the actions of individual-
ly rational states produced irrational results for the nation as a whole.”205 
 
201 David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1153, 1155 (1998). 
202 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 ( J ames Madison) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987) (argu-
ing that the efficacy of “parchment barriers” were overrated in mitigating the “encroaching spirit 
of power”). 
203 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in JAMES MAD-
ISON: WRITINGS 69, 71 ( J ack N. Rakove ed., 1999).  
204 Id. 
205 Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article 
I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010). Recent originalist accounts of the Founding 
emphasize that the early constitutional framework had a public good character to it. See, e.g., 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 44-46 (emphasizing the Federalist Papers’ 
focus on common defense and trade goals); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
23 (2010) (noting Congress’s “power to regulate interactions or affairs among the several states” 
was motivated by collective action problems and spillover effects). However, according to one 
recent account, subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has distinguished between those 
collective action problems resulting from economic externalities and those flowing from political 
externalities. Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual 
Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1121 (2012). I have elsewhere argued against the utility of collective 
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Recalcitrance of the states, as noted above, had already imperiled the 
nascent union. During the Revolutionary War, the requisitions system 
through which the Continental Congress funded military efforts sometimes 
yielded only thirty-seven percent of the monies sought,206 with compliance 
dropping to twenty-five percent at the end of hostilities.207 The Confedera-
tion’s ongoing inability to service foreign and domestic debts also posed a 
direct risk to sovereignty, since it rendered the national government incapa-
ble of responding to great power threats like Spain’s closure of the Missis-
sippi River and New Orleans, or to foreign policy irritants, such as the 
Barbary pirates.208 These failures made the case for new national institu-
tions all the more compelling. 
In this context, the Philadelphia Convention drafted a Constitution that, 
unlike the Articles of Confederation, would elicit cooperative investments 
from the states to build new national institutions with public-good aspects 
such as “military defense,” “a unified market for goods, capital, and labor,”209 
a new system for federal taxation, and a new national financial system.210 
Mindful of the Articles’ failure to elicit these goods, the Convention 
instructed the Committee of Detail to allow the power “to legislate in all 
Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to 
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legisla-
tion.”211 Taking these steps, the Framers anticipated that states would reap 
benefits that would dwarf their original contributions once the New Union 
had fostered a wide array of new institutions.  
In sum, both preconditions for textual rigidity—oligopolistic political 
competition and infrastructural fragility—were present in the Founding 
Era. This distinct (and perhaps rare) combination of circumstances explains 
why textual rigidity may have been the right approach to the problem of 
stabilizing the U.S. Constitution. 
 
action models of federalism. See Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism 
Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217 (2014) (answering the eponymous question in the negative). 
206 ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 12, 14 tbl.1 (1993). 
207 PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 37 (1963). Brown identifies a more general “breakdown of taxation by the states 
governments.” BROWN, supra note 206, at 185. 
208 BROWN, supra note 206, at 17-19. 
209 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 205, at 140, 149. 
210 See BROWN, supra note 206, at 186 (emphasizing taxing power); STUDENSKI & 
KROOSS, supra note 207, at 39-41 (emphasizing taxing, borrowing, spending, and coinage powers).  
211  RECORDS, supra note 28, at 131-32; accord Cooter & Siegel, supra note 193, at 123-24 (dis-
cussing Convention deliberations on Congress’s commerce power).  
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2.  Textual Rigidity as a Response to the Strategic Threat of Amendment 
How then did textual rigidity respond to the problems that faced the 
Constitution’s drafters? The mechanism has two elements. First, rigidity 
promotes constitution-specific investments by reducing the threat of an 
actor strategically employing the amendment power. Second, those invest-
ments, in turn, lock participants into the Constitution and thereby make 
secession more costly. To invoke Albert Hirschman’s terminology again, 
limiting the strategic use of “voice” conduces to “loyalty,” and then the 
prolonged exercise of “loyalty” raises the cost of exit.212 This subsection 
addresses the mechanism’s first element, while the second element is 
examined in the following subsection. 
A strategic request for amendment is one made for the purpose of ex-
ploiting other parties’ postratification investment in relationship-specific 
assets. The goal in making such a request is to extract a greater share of the 
net surplus from a constitution-making endeavor. For example, imagine a 
Constitution that creates a legislative body whose members are elected in 
single-member districts.213 Responding to the incentives created by that 
arrangement, a national-level interest group might invest heavily in local 
networks of candidates with close connections to the electorate rather than 
developing a nationally recognized brand. These investments would con-
tribute to the public good of stable political competition, but they might 
also be vulnerable to the threat of strategic renegotiation. For example, an 
opposing interest group might press an amendment directing the use of a 
party-list proportional representation system. In the system described, such 
an amendment would undermine its competitor’s investments, and, if the 
amendment were easy to achieve, the mere threat of such an amendment 
would elicit costly bargaining or even preclude investments in party infra-
structure ab initio.  
Other examples of hold-up can be imagined in the trade context. Imag-
ine an interest group that contributes to the national government’s invest-
ments in banking infrastructure but that also foregoes development of its 
own monetary institutions. Its investments would be imperiled by an 
amendment proposing limits on national monetary authority and a redistri-
bution of such authority to the states. In this example, as with the forego-
ing, the easier the amendment is to achieve, the cheaper strategic invocation 
of the amendment power becomes. 
 
212 Cf. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 120-21 (contrasting the use of voice and exit in firms 
and governments).  
213 In fact, this is the system the U.S. Constitution contemplates for the House of Repre-
sentatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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A strategic request for amendment need not focus on a point already 
crisply resolved in constitutional text. Provided that other parties have 
relationship-specific investments in the constitutional order, amendments 
can be used to redistribute surpluses between parties in the absence of a 
textual settlement. Consider the example of American slavery. The 1787 
Constitution did not expressly prohibit or endorse slavery, although six of 
its provisions implicitly endorsed and protected the practice.214 Arguments 
for the prohibition of slavery were vociferously pressed in the antebellum 
period.215 It is telling that Congress’s response was not to try to settle the 
matter by constitutional amendment or legislation. Instead, Congress 
installed a “gag rule,” precluding debate on the matter,216 and pursued 
territorial compromises that delayed any final reckoning.217 Bracketing the 
profound moral questions raised by such deferrals, these legislative respons-
es implicitly recognized that slavery presented questions then too divisive 
for national resolution. In the same light, the rigorousness of Article V and 
its focus on the slave trade,218 can be construed as evidence that the Framers 
intimated the possibility that slavery could split apart the Union. By making 
it all but impossible to amend the Constitution with respect to slavery, the 
Framers delayed any resolution of the slavery question until the Union was 
sufficiently strong enough to survive that rupture.219 Article V thus operated 
to preserve constitutional ambiguities as much as it protected elements of 
the constitutional deal set forth in clear text.220  
 
214 See WALDSTREICHER, supra note 111, at 101 (noting that the clauses relating to slavery 
“epitomized” the Constitution’s “remarkable combination of precision and vagueness”). 
215 See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN 
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 65-93 (1996) (describing the social movements behind anti-
slavery petitioning). 
216 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT 
CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 58 (1981). 
217 See LOUIS P. MASUR, THE CIVIL WAR: A CONCISE HISTORY 11-12 (2011) (examining 
the specifics of the Compromise of 1850); see also DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING 
CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 90-120 (1976) (detailing the negotiation of the compromise). 
218 Article V specifically states “ that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year 
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in 
the Ninth Section of the first Article.” U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V consequently operated to 
preserve the provision in Article I, Section 9, which precluded Congress from prohibiting the 
importation of slaves until 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
219 This is a very narrowly defined view of success in constitutitonal design. Indeed, I cannot 
emphasize enough that my aim here is neither to endorse nor critique the Framers’ approach. The 
question of how to grapple with slavery under conditions in which the institution has considerable 
political support, and where secession might have prolonged its evil effects, strikes me as a 
profoundly difficult one—and one well outside the scope of the current Article.  
220 It is nevertheless debatable whether this balance succeeded on its own terms. The Com-
promise of 1850, which admitted California as a free state, upset the equilibrium between free and 
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In each of these examples, Article V operated like a no-modification rule 
in a private-law contract by effectively switching the parties’ choice set from 
“adhere-modify-exit” to “adhere or exit.” This alteration in the parties’ 
options mitigated the risk of strategic amendment by making the expected 
payoff from such renegotiation much smaller ex ante. In this fashion, Article 
V took largely off the table an option that would have increased the risk of 
hold-up. The inability of parties to strategically amend both mitigated a 
reason not to ratify and removed a source of post-ratification inefficiency.  
Taking modification off the table has a positive effect on constitutional 
stability even assuming that exit remains a substantial possibility. Parties that 
would engage in strategic hold-up by seeking constitutional amendment in 
light of others’ asset-specific investments would not simply switch strategies 
in the face of a no-modification rule and threaten exit (so as to gain the 
same concessions). Amendment and exit are not fungible because constitu-
tions are not comprised of single rules or even a single-digit number of 
rules. Rather, they typically bundle plural packages of “enabling rules and 
constraining rules together as a take-it-or-leave-it package.”221 All else being 
equal, it is likely that some sticks in the bundle benefit a party while other 
sticks impose undesirable constraints. By exiting, a party loses both the 
benefits and the burdens of a constitution because exit is an all-or-nothing 
decision.222 
By contrast, renegotiation through amendment allows the same party to 
sort between the sticks of the constitutional bundle, choosing for disappro-
bation only those measures it views as undesirable. As a result, in the 
ordinary course of events, renegotiation of the constitutional deal through 
amendment will be a far more attractive vehicle for strategic exploitation 
than wholesale exit. The former, but not the latter, allows a potential 
defector to select the parts of the constitutional bargain it finds beneficial. 
By taking modification off the table, textual rigidity leaves open only the 
more costly option of exit. At least in some class of cases, an interest group 
 
slave states and did not resolve how slavery would be treated in the territories. To Southern 
politicians like John Calhoun, the Compromise destroyed “irretrievably the equilibrium between 
the two sections.” MASUR, supra note 217, at 12.  
221 Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 806 
(2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)). In the United States, federal officials take an oath 
to defend the whole Constitution. See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 3.  
222 Cf. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL 
ANALYSIS 33 (2004) (exploring some of the effects of “‘lumpy’ or ‘winner-take-all’” political 
goods).  
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willing to game the amendment process will not chance the price of exit. 
Hence, once modification is off the table, exit does not pick up all the slack. 
3.  Subconstitutional Investments and the Risk of Exit 
There is a second strand linking textual rigidity to constitutional surviv-
al. Beyond mitigating hold-up, textual obduracy also dampens the allure of 
exit. The link between rigidity and the mitigation of exit risk is not direct. 
It is mediated through subconstitutional institutions—institutions that 
necessarily emerge as part of the downstream functioning of a constitutional 
framework, rather than from the text or through amendment.223 Such 
institutions are needed to produce the public goods that justify a constitu-
tion’s creation, such as peaceful political competition, economic growth, and 
national security. Two specific examples of such goods include a political 
party system and a fiscal infrastructure. 
Textual rigidity enables the creation of such subconstitutional institu-
tions, because parties to the constitution would not contribute to these 
institutions without assurances against hold-up. But the new institutional 
ecosystem also has independent causal effect, because it both fixes those 
same parties’ investments in an asset-specific form and also enmeshes the 
parties in the constitutional order. If those parties exit the constitution, they 
will lose the tailored resources, knowledge, and skills they previously 
invested in the new institutional ecosystem. In this way, institutions enabled 
by textual rigidity foster tighter lock-in to the underlying constitution and 
diminish resistance to cooperative investments. This adds up to a virtuous 
circle—a set of “self-reinforcing processes that make reversals increasingly 
unattractive.”224  
This virtuous-circle mechanism is grounded on the assumption that con-
stitutions not only establish basic governance frameworks, but also “induce[] 
the development of economic and political organizations.”225 A new 
 
223 My use of the term “institutions” here is a loose one, and at odds with at least one leading 
work. According to Douglass North, “[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 
(1990). By contrast, “[o]rganizations are created to take advantages of th[e] opportunities” 
institutions create. Id. at 7. Here, I often discuss “organizations” in North’s sense of the word, but, 
at least in this context, I find his terminology potentially confusing. Thus, I use the term 
“institutions” in its more colloquial sense.  
224 PIERSON, supra note 222, at 35. For an interesting example of another self-reinforcing 
process of political stabilitization mediated through norms, rather than via third-party enforce-
ment, see the discussion of Russian integration in Estonia in Avner Greif & David D. Laitin, A 
Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 633, 647 (2004).  
225 NORTH, supra note 223, at 8. 
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ecosystem of parties, institutions, and networks is necessary for realizing 
welfare gains inherent in the incomplete constitutional bargain. In their 
absence, a new constitutional framework would be a dead letter, and sought-
after public goods would never materialize. The necessary institutional 
ecosystem, however, need not be memorialized in a constitution’s text. To 
the contrary, new parties, institutions, and networks may take an exclusively 
subconstitutional form, as they have in the United States.  
Despite its “subconstitutional” character, in that it is not located in text, 
a new institutional ecosystem will inevitably develop along a path tailored 
specifically to a particular constitution’s topography. For example, elections 
create incentives to organize campaigns for political office in specific ways 
in certain geographic jurisdictions.226 The fiscal infrastructure of a new 
constitution will also induce distinctive patterns of investment and commer-
cial activity, not least by restricting or expanding the expected supply of 
credit. And by resolving public-good problems that impede certain channels 
of internal commerce and external trade, a newly constituted government 
may encourage investment in some trading relationships over others.227  
This asset-specific infrastructure for the production of public goods has 
the effect of making a pivotal party’s exit from a constitution less likely. 
Such infrastructure has value, in large part, because it fits tightly within a 
particular constitution’s text, but would have “far less value under alternative 
institutional arrangements.”228 For example, a political party would cease to 
be tailored if fundamental parameters of the voting system were to change, 
which could occur if local connections were to become more important than 
national profiles. Trade relationships with another country would cease to 
have as much value if one’s home country were to go to war with that other 
nation. Currency would become worthless without a central bank that backs 
it. The asset specificity of cooperative investments raises the exit costs for 
 
226 See, e.g., William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the 
History of Political Science, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753, 755 (1982) (discussing how “the constitu-
tional definitions of winning [elections] have an effect on the parties thereby generated,” such as 
how plurality voting tends to give rise to a two-party system).  
227 NORTH, supra note 223, at 77 (“The kinds of information and knowledge required by the 
entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of a particular institutional context.”).  
228 PIERSON, supra note 223, at 149; cf. NORTH, supra note 223, at 7 (stating that “lock-in 
. . . comes from the symbiotic relationship” between a general framework and specific entities 
that have adapted to that framework). For the point being made in reference to political institu-
tions, see PIERSON, supra note 222, at 149 (“Individual politicians, political organizations such as 
parties, interest groups, and even ordinary citizens will, over time, develop assets that may be 
specific to a political institution (or set of institutions).”). For the same point being made in 
reference to commercial institutions, see Daron Acemoglu et al., The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546, 562-63 (2005) (discussing 
how European commercial interests secured institutional reforms between 1500 and 1850). 
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parties to the constitution who have “invest[ed] in specialized skills, deep-
en[ed] relationships with other individuals and organizations, and devel-
op[ed] particular political and social identities.”229 Over time, that is, the 
positive network externalities from learning and adapting to a particular 
political or commercial context230 and the correlative cost of switching to 
another institutional framework both grow.231 The expected loss in value of 
cooperative investments becomes, in effect, a tax upon exit from the consti-
tution. As this exit tax grows over time, parties can be increasingly confi-
dent that their investments will not be deployed against them. Confidence 
thus induces investment, which in turn fosters greater confidence.  
While perhaps small at a constitution’s inception, this lock-in effect 
grows over time through the operation of a positive feedback mechanism.232 
In the long term, that process tends to generate “massive increasing returns” 
on an initial investment.233 Under these conditions, participants in a 
constitutional system likely develop “[a]daptive expectations . . . because 
increased prevalence of contracting based on a specific institution will 
reduce uncertainties about the permanence of that rule.”234 These expecta-
tions then further entrench the constitution,235 deepening the effect of the 
virtuous circle mechanism. 
 
229 PIERSON, supra note 223, at 35.  
230 See NORTH, supra note 224, at 95 (identifying “significant learning effects for organiza-
tions that arise in consequence of the opportunity set provided by [an] institutional framework”); 
PIERSON, supra note 222, at 24 (“Knowledge gained in the operation of complex systems also 
leads to higher returns from continuing use.”).  
231 See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International Relations (“Where 
investments in the specific assets of an institution are high, actors will find the cost of any 
institutional change that endangers these assets to be quite high; indeed, actors in this situation 
may be reluctant to run risks of any change at all.”), in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999). 
232 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitments, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 687 (2011) (describing “[s]tructures and processes of 
political decisionmaking, as well as particular policy outcomes, [that] often reshape politics in ways 
that increase support for the institutions themselves” as mechanisms of “positive political 
feedback” (emphasis omitted)).  
233 NORTH, supra note 223, at 95. 
234 Id.  
235 Moreover, the sheer complexity of the institutional system, with different rules, excep-
tions, and standards develop to the advantage of one or another interest group, and grow over 
time, further increasing systemic stability. 
  
2014] The Function of Article V 1215 
 
4.  Subconstitutional Institutions with Lock-In Effects in the Early 
Republic 
Through the parsimonious text of the 1787 Constitution, the Framers 
“sought to create a set of political institutions and to empower those 
institutions to deal creatively with ongoing developments . . . [through 
means] outside the Constitution” itself.236 In this subsection, I offer two 
case studies to support the causal mechanism proposed here—political 
parties and the national financial infrastructure that coalesced around the 
Bank of the United States. I focus on institutions that emerged at the 
beginning of the Republic because it is during the first few decades that 
textual rigidity was most likely to be useful.237 My claim here is that both of 
these subconstitutional institutions can be plausibly understood as having 
been enabled by textual rigidity. In both cases, I am willing to concede that 
there is a nonfrivolous argument that the institutional innovation might be 
viewed as one that demanded a formal amendment, which in practice was 
unavailable due to Article V. At the same time, Article V stabilized expecta-
tions in a way that made possible the practical investments that allowed 
parties and banks to develop as subconstitutional adaptions, rather than as 
additions to the 1787 text.  
a.  National Political Parties 
Consider first the evolution of the early Republic’s national political 
party system. This system was tailored to the 1787 constitutional order. It 
also yielded increasing stability-related returns up through the late 1810s. To 
be sure, the party system underwent transformation after the War of 1812, 
and then collapsed in the late 1850s, opening the road to secession and the 
Civil War.238 For my limited purposes, it suffices to show that the first party 
system was the kind of stabilizing cooperative investment enabled by 
constitutional rigidity, and that it promoted stability in the first two high-
risk decades of the early Republic.  
The architects of the 1787 Constitution famously “did not believe in po-
litical parties as such” and instead “had a keen terror of party spirit and its 
 
236 Young, supra note 21, at 456. 
237 At the same time, I do not mean to imply that these are the only such virtuously en-
trenching institutions. 
238 For a brief recap of this history, see DEAN MCSWEENEY & JOHN ZVESPER, AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE FORMATION, DECLINE, AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN 
PARTY SYSTEM 13-21 (1991). 
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evil consequences.”239 Early federal candidates believed it dishonorable to 
campaign actively for office, and so turnout in federal elections tended to be 
small.240 Yet by September 1792, James Madison could write that national 
political parties were “natural to most political societies”241 and, by the 
Second Congress, “most officeholders could be identified as Federalists or 
(Jeffersonian) Republicans.”242 Although these new political formations did 
not entirely resemble today’s political parties243 and kept their distance from 
the more grassroots Democratic-Republican societies of the day,244 they 
were still characterized by “a comprehensive and common ideology.”245 
This two-party system was tightly fitted to the specifics of the 1787 con-
stitutional framework in both etiology and form. At its origin, the party 
system was “largely a[n] alliance between . . . elites” in the Philadelphia 
Convention.246 Recent empirical analysis of voting patterns in the Philadel-
phia Convention demonstrates that, by its close, “the interest constellations 
within the Convention” as revealed in patterns in voting coalitions “were 
similar to those that would exist in the newly settled political field,” so that 
“state [delegate] alignments forecasted the contours of the future party 
system.”247 Analysis of voting patterns in the 1789 Congress also reveal that 
early, pre-party-system votes were “highly unstable, shifting, and chaotic” as 
 
239 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITI-
MATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1840, at viii (1970); see also id. at 52-53 
(arguing the Framers relied not on the “mutual checks of political parties,” but on the “classic 
doctrine of separation of power” as sources of “liberty and stability”); id. at 64-73 (discussing 
Federalist No. 10 as a tract against parties); accord MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 238, at 41 
(discussing Madison’s arguments against factions in Federalist No. 10 and how they informed his 
“case for [a] large and economically heterogeneous republic”). 
240 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, 158-60 (2009). Nor was the design that emerged from the Pennsylvania State House in 
the summer of 1787 friendly to populist democracy. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 32-33 (2005) (describing the “antidemo-
cratic assumptions” of delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention). 
241 WOOD, supra note 240, at 161.  
242 JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND LOOK 79 (2011); see also WOOD, supra 
note 240, at 162 (discussing the rise of the ( J effersonian) Republican Party and the emergence of 
“consistent voting blocs in the Congress” of 1793). 
243 See ALDRICH, supra note 243, at 99 (detailing ways in which “these first parties fell far 
short of the modern political party”). 
244 See WOOD, supra note 240, at 162-64 (describing the growth of these societies and noting 
that “elite leaders like Jefferson and Madison . . . tended to keep well clear of them”). 
245 Id. at 172; see also WILENTZ, supra note 240, at 49 (noting the ideological coherence of 
the emerging Republican Party in the early 1790s). 
246 WOOD, supra note 240, at 64. 
247 Adam Slez & John Levi Martin, Political Action and Party Formation in the United States 
Constitutional Convention, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 42, 43 (2007). 
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a consequence of cycling-based instability.248 It may thus be that the push 
toward a two-party system was deepened by the need to mitigate cycling 
problems in the federal Congress,249 making the national party system a de 
facto adaptation to the Constitution’s democratic mechanisms. 
The first party system also had the effect of promoting political stability 
in the perilous first years of the Republic. Parties did not merely articulate 
popular concerns, they also “helped simultaneously to channel that discon-
tent back into the system.”250 As Larry Kramer notes, “[w]hen disgruntled 
citizens began murmuring about secession and civil war, party leaders were 
able to encourage them to turn to the polls . . . .”251 During the sectional 
fracas over the Alien and Sedition Acts leaders of the new national parties 
in the other state legislatures ensured that the Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions, which argued for the unconstitutionality of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, had a limited destabilizing effect.252 Even in the throes of the 
partisan crisis of the 1800 election, the party structures dampened proclivi-
ties to exit the constitutional order. Hence, Federalist letters and memoirs 
from the late 1790s evince “a basic predisposition . . . to accept a defeat, 
fairly administered, even in 1800 before that defeat was a certainty.”253 That 
is, the Federalist network disseminated the view that electoral defeat was 
not an occasion for defection from the Constitution. At the same time, 
parties served as the vehicles for expressing “sectional interests” in a way 
that did not result in terminal instability.254 Consequently, political parties 
 
248 ALDRICH, supra note 243, at 78. The observation that the use of a majority-vote rule by a 
collectivity to choose between more than two options will yield unstable outcomes absent some 
kind of agenda control was first made by the Marquis de Condorcet and formalized by Kenneth 
Arrow. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 
1963) (providing general conditions under which the exercise of collective choices through 
majority-rule voting does not yield stable outcomes).  
249 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and 
Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 507 (1981) (explaining how “institutional restrictions on 
the domain of exchange induce stability, not legislative exchange per se” (emphasis omitted)). 
250 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 273 (2000); see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRI-
UMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 9 (2007) (“[The revolution-
ary generation] created political parties as institutionalized channels for ongoing debate, which 
eventually permitted dissent to be regarded not as a treasonable act, but as a legitimate voice in an 
endless argument.”). 
251 Kramer, supra note 250, at 273.  
252 Id. at 275.  
253 HOFSTADTER, supra note 239, at 130; see also id. at 141 (noting that the Federalist pres-
ence in the Senate and the judiciary may have mitigated the sting of a prospective defeat).  
254 ELLIS, supra note 250, at 186. For evidence that this stabilization effect persists into the 
Second Party System, see JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 
31 (4th ed. 2000). 
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locked in powerful interest groups through investments in assets specific to 
the 1787 Constitution—assets that, over time, delivered political stability at 
an otherwise uncertain moment for the nation.255 
b.  The Bank of the United States 
At first blush, the Bank of the United States seems an unpromising can-
didate for the positive feedback effects of textual rigidity. The Bank was 
first established in 1791 over a chorus of constitutional criticisms, and its 
charter expired twenty years later without immediate renewal.256 The 
Second Bank, chartered in 1816, saw its renewal legislation vetoed by 
President Jackson in 1832.257 But both the 1816 and the 1836 dissolutions of 
the Bank triggered runs on state banks, suspensions of their operation, and 
national financial crises.258 Rather than suggesting superfluity, these conse-
quences of the Bank’s dissolution point to its pivotal role in the new nation’s 
“modern financial system,”259 a system that enabled “history’s most success-
ful emerging market, attracting the capital or investors in older nations 
seeking higher returns.”260 The Bank, like national political parties, was thus 
a post-ratification institutional innovation, created within the new constitu-
tional framework—and one that proved essential to the survival of the new 
constitutional order. By fostering a robust internal economy, even as 
frictions with foreign powers limited the growth of external trade,261 the 
Bank locked in states and important interest groups into a growing Ameri-
can economy (and therefore the American Constitution) well capable of 
surviving the financial contractions of 1812 and 1836.  
At the time of Bank opened in December 1791, only five other banks 
existed in the United States.262 The new Bank, Hamilton predicted, would 
 
255 At the same time, the rise of parties likely exacerbated the electoral crisis of 1800. See 
Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 551, 582-87 (2004) (discussing how the Constitution’s electoral system failed to properly 
function in 1800 upon the emergence of national political parties). This shows how institutions can 
have complex, even partially offsetting, effects on constitutional survival. 
256 The best history of the Bank remains BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN 
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114-43, 197-450 (1957); see also Hugh 
Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789–1914, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 645, 646-50 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000). 
257 HAMMOND, supra note 256, at 405. 
258 STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 19, 110. 
259 WOOD, supra note 240, at 298. 
260 Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. Growth, 42 
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 1, 20-21 (2005).  
261 HAMMOND, supra note 257, at 148. 
262 Id. at 128.  
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increase the money supply through its emission of noninflationary paper 
currency, lower the cost of government borrowing, and facilitate the pay-
ment and collection of taxes.263 In assuming the debt of the several states, 
and consequently assuring bondholders of a reliable interest stream, the 
Bank would “liberate the country’s commercial energy by yoking high 
finance to national projects.”264  
Yet Hamilton failed to predict perhaps the most important policy conse-
quence of creating the Bank. On account of being the largest transactor in 
the money market, the main government fiscal depository, and a general 
creditor of other banks, the Bank “automatically exercised a general restraint 
upon the banking system” and effectively established “central bank control 
of credit.”265 Apart from competing with local banks, the Bank acted as their 
“constant regulator” by dint of its collection of balances due from local 
banks.266 The Bank’s dissolution in 1812 only revealed the Treasury’s “need” 
for a central bank, “not merely to lend it money but to marshal the banking 
system” and to maintain a credible currency.267 The Bank’s dissolution not 
only generated new interstate frictions as banks declined to lend across state 
lines,268 with the looming British invasion, but also proved near “disastrous 
for the war effort.”269  
The Bank fit both criteria for a subconstitutional institution with lock-in 
effects. First, it was a costly innovation tightly configured to the specifics of 
the new Constitution, one that required expenditure of much political 
capital to establish.270 A more flexible constitutional amendment regime, 
which would have enabled less costly modifications of the Bank’s structure 
and simpler defaults on creditors, may have impeded the expenditure of that 
political capital. The Bank also generated a welfare surplus by providing a 
fiscal infrastructure for the federal government.271 And, despite some 
 
263 STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 60.  
264 WILLIAM HOGELAND, FOUNDING FINANCE: HOW DEBT, SPECULATION, FORE-
CLOSURES, PROTESTS, AND CRACKDOWNS MADE US A NATION 161 (2012). 
265 HAMMOND, supra note 257, at 198-99; accord STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 
72 (“The Bank had cooperated closely with the Treasury in attempting to stabilize the money 
market and protect the banking system.”). 
266 HAMMOND, supra note 257, at 200. 
267 Id. at 230; accord STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 72-73 (describing the “pro-
found repercussions on the economy” of the 1811 refusal to reauthorize).  
268 STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 80. 
269 WOOD, supra note 240, at 673.  
270 In particular, debate within the executive branch was fierce. See HAMMOND, supra note 
257, at 114-18 (describing enactment history and debates within the Washington Administration). 
271 See id. at 208 (“The Bank acted as fiscal agent of the Treasury: it effected payments of 
interest on the public debt, at home and abroad; . . . it moderated the outflow of specie; and it 
supplied bullion and foreign coins to the Mint.”).  
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opposition from state banks, its central bank function enabled the growth of 
state banking.272  
Second, the Bank, had lock-in effects notwithstanding its two dissolu-
tions. Most obviously, the Bank’s initial subscriptions induced fiscal invest-
ments by key members of the political class.273 This had the effect of giving 
a large number of key political actors a stake in the federal government’s 
success.274 More subtly, the Bank grew the supply of national credit,275 and 
thereby fostered an internal market that tangled together interests across 
the several states.276 Without the expansion of credit enabled by the First 
Bank, it is at least arguable that American “society could never have com-
mercialized as rapidly as it did.”277 To be sure, not every decision by the 
Bank was correct and beneficial to the national economy.278 Yet on balance, 
it seems fair to label the Bank as a rigidity-enabled instrument of entangle-
ment that promoted stabilization in the early Republic. 
C.  Anchoring a Constitution in Cooperative Institutions 
This Part has identified two causal mechanisms by which textual rigidity 
promotes a constitution’s survival: (1) by mitigating hold-ups, and (2) by 
inducing virtuous circles of investment and confidence-accretion. Despite 
the Framers’ inchoate comprehension of a constitutional amendment’s 
dynamic consequences, there is some evidence that Article V in fact had 
both effects in the key period of the early Republic. These mechanisms 
 
272 Id. at 198-99. The Second Bank was instrumental in ending state bank runs and suspen-
sions triggered by the dissolution of the First Bank. Id. at 246-47. It is no small irony that those 
same state banks resented the Bank’s enabling constraints and “from the beginning . . . sought to 
weaken or destroy it.” WOOD, supra note 240, at 294. 
273 A third of the sitting members of Congress and the state of New York were part of the 
Bank’s first subscription. HAMMOND, supra note 257, at 123. 
274 See id. at 206 (highlighting President Jefferson’s concern that that the Bank held America 
under its “vassalage” through its numerous politician-stockholders). 
275 See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 207, at 107 (“The Federal government [i.e., the 
Bank] . . . encouraged the inflationary expansion of state banks by accepting their notes in 
payment for public lands and by building up their reserves through the deposit of public 
moneys.”); accord Rockoff, supra note 257, at 647 (commending the First Bank’s practices for 
“helping to eliminate unsound banking”).  
276 See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 144 (2007) (“By 1819, economic relations had become 
strongly interconnected . . . .”). 
277 WOOD, supra note 240, at 297. Wood here is referring to the growth of state banks, but 
my point is that the growth in effective state banking would not have been possible without the 
central banking function served by the Bank of the United States. Cf. HAMMOND, supra note 257, 
at 246-47 (describing how the Second Bank kickstarted the credit system in 1816). 
278 See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 276, at 142-43 (noting how the Second Bank’s 1819 credit 
contraction deepened a financial crisis). 
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diverge from the dominant accounts of constitutional survival canvassed in 
Section I.B., which focus more on a need for “enforcers” drawn from “the 
opposition” or “the citizenry.”279 On the latter view, the central problem of 
constitutional rule is defection, and constitutions persist when they succeed 
in lowering an enforcer’s cost of detecting, preventing, and correcting 
defections by others.280 This view focuses on the question of how to mini-
mize the costs of enforcement.281 It also leads to a concern for how constitu-
tional text can serve as a “focal point” to “narrow[] the range of 
disagreement[s],” thereby lowering the costs of coordinating opposition to 
constitutional breaches.282  
By contrast, the mechanisms presented in this Part focus on the incen-
tives that a constitution creates for parties to comply with the document, in 
the absence of third-party enforcement. This is consistent with private-
contracting dynamics, where deals abound even when enforcement fails as a 
 
279 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 76; accord Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 
CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 143 (1992) (concluding that the “most important problem” in constitu-
tional design is “how such a contract is enforced”). 
280 See Mittal & Weingast, supra note 123, at 279 (discussing how constitutions may limit the 
extra-constitutional actions of citizens who feel that changes in public policy threaten their 
livelihoods); accord Sutter, supra note 13, at 139-40 ( focusing on limiting defection risk). North 
and Weingast’s famous account of the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England places its emphasis on 
a similar theme. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 
803, 817-19 (1989). They argue that the revolutionary settlement created a “self-enforcing” 
arrangement in which Parliament could check the monarch by vetoing “major changes in polic[y],” 
while Parliament was itself constrained by its internal collective action costs, the libertarian bent 
of the governing Whigs, and “a politically independent judiciary.” Id. This is in essence a claim 
about the mutuality of potential constitutional enforcement.  
281 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 78-80, 88-90 (developing a theoretical account of 
constitutional endurance based on the active participation of interest groups in policing a 
constitutional bargain).  
282 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 6, at 912-13; accord Mittal & Weingast, supra note 123, at 
284 (“When citizens fail to act in concert . . . leaders can exploit these differences . . . .”); 
Sutter, supra note 13, at 145 (describing constitutional enforcement as a public good and identify-
ing free-rider and monitoring problems related to enforcement); see also Barry R. Weingast, The 
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (1997) 
(arguing that political “pacts” underpinning democracy “create a focal solution that resolves the 
coordination dilemmas confronting elites and citizens”). Constitutional texts enable coordination 
because they provide “common knowledge,” which is essential to any form of social cooperation. 
MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE 7 (2001). “Constitutional focal points” also “define appropriate bounds 
on governments and rights of citizens” and induce enforcement, provided that citizens believe 
themselves better off with those rules than without. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, 
supra note 88, at 352-53. 
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result of “the dynamics of interactions” generating “mutually built assets of 
value to either party.”283  
III.  REVISITING THE PUZZLES OF ARTICLE V 
This Part reconsiders the positive and normative puzzles identified in 
Part I in light of Part II’s proposed causal link between textual rigidity and 
constitutional survival. To begin with, I return to the question of why the 
U.S. Constitution’s survival seems so anomalous in comparison to foreign 
constitutions. The first Section of this Part thus reconsiders the question of 
why rigid constitutions are so rare from a global perspective. Next, I 
reconsider the normative critiques of Article V. I suggest that accounting for 
the function of textual rigidity casts these critiques in a fresh light. Finally, 
I press further on the normative implications of the analysis here by sug-
gesting it illuminates ongoing debates about the legitimacy of both judicial 
review generally and methods of constitutional interpretation specifically.  
A.  The Infrequency of Rigid Constitutions 
If my arguments in Part II respecting the U.S. Constitution have any 
purchase, they ought to provoke some puzzlement among students of 
comparative constitutionalism: if rigidity promotes constitutional survival 
in the manner suggested by Part II, why does comparative epidemiological 
analysis of constitutional survival suggest that it so often fails?284 That is, 
why is the United States an outlier? There are two reasons for the dearth of 
observable successful rigid constitutions beyond U.S. borders. These 
reasons explain respectively why rigidity will not always be an appropriate 
design choice and, even when it is warranted, why rigidity still often fails. 
In tandem, I contend, these reasons plausibly account for the infrequency of 
textual rigidity in durable constitutions across the world.  
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing again the rarity of rigid constitu-
tions akin to the U.S. Constitution. Figure 1 below plots data for 169 
constitutions derived from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) 
 
283 Éric Brousseau, Contracts: From Bilateral Sets of Incentives to the Multi-Level Governance of 
Relations, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 37, 57 (É. Brousseau & J. 
Glachant eds., 2008). This is the familiar point from game theory that a cooperative game that is 
not stable if played only once can be stable in circumstances of repeat play because of the present-
discounted value of the stream of expected future benefits. Thierry Pénard, Game Theory and 
Institutions, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra at 170-71. 
284 See supra Section  I.A. 
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database.285 The y-axis shows the duration of the constitution.286 The x-axis 
records the rate of amendment as calculated by the CCP. Data for the 169 
least-amended documents (up to and including the U.S. Constitution) is 
presented.287 The resulting scatter plot can be understood as snapshot 
estimating how likely rigid constitutions are to survive.  
 
 
Figure 1: Duration in Years of Rigid Constitutions (n=169) 
 
 
 
 
 
285 COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, http://www.comparativeconstitutions 
project.org (last visited March 22, 2014). I am grateful to Tom Ginsburg for providing this data.  
286 Because the publicly available part of the database does not specify duration data for 
surviving constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does not appear in Figure 1. 
287 To this end, I use the “amendment rate” variable in the database. Descriptive statistics 
for this variable are presented at ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 226 tbl.A4. 
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This data suggests that, at least within the pool of rigid constitutions, 
the odds of endurance are low. Only two constitutions in the sample proved 
relatively durable: the Bhutanese Constitution of 1953 (52 years) and the El 
Salvadorian Constitution of 1886 (53 years). Lifespans akin to that of the 
U.S. Constitution are relatively rare. No other clear trend emerges immedi-
ately from the data. This suggests that much more granular analysis using 
local information about specific nations’ political and institutional circum-
stances is needed to identify the causal forces at work. The CCP database, 
however, does not contain that data at present.  
The analysis of Part II, nevertheless, points to two reasons why rigid 
constitutions seem to rarely persist in the fashion of the U.S. Constitution. 
The first reason for rigidity’s infrequency was intimated at the opening of 
Part II: textual rigidity is a response to the specific contracting problem of 
hold-up. It is not a general solution to the problems of constitutional 
survival.288 As previously mentioned, not all constitutional drafters need to 
be concerned about hold-up. They need not be concerned, for example, if 
robust national institutions already exist. Hence, constitution-makers in 
post-Soviet Eastern Europe did not need rigidity they already possessed 
many necessary state institutions, aside from the potential fiscal and epis-
temic aid from their western European counterparts.289 Further, there is no 
reason on focus on hold-up concerns if there is no set of robust political 
competitors who might readily unsettle the constitutional order. Only when 
neither robust institutions nor oligopolistic political competition is present 
does textual rigidity have potential utility. Hence, if there is no large set of 
cases in which both these factors are absent—as the data in Figure 1 sug-
gests—constitution-makers would be wise to view textual flexibility with 
skepticism.  
The second reason for rigidity’s rarity is that textual inflexibility is a 
risky strategy for producing constitutional stability. Close attention to the 
mechanisms identified in Part II suggests that the success of a rigid consti-
tution will turn disproportionately on decisions made by the first wave of 
postenactment interest groups and factions. Interest groups in this period 
 
288 The failure of the Articles of Confederations, which required unanimity for amendments, 
suggests that rigidity can also induce failure when a constitution fails to provide space for 
subconstitutional institutions or is poorly designed. Given that both the Articles and the 1787 
Constitution are rigid, it is not plausible to ascribe the former’s failure solely to its inflexibility. 
The documents’ contents and enactment politics, not merely the amendment processes, mattered 
greatly.  
289 See generally Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 447 (1991) (examining the constitution-making enterprise of Post-Soviet Bloc countries 
through a comparative lens). 
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have two potential strategies in response to a rigid constitution. First, they 
can make cooperative investments, which will have increasing welfare 
returns and will embed interest groups into a specific constitutional frame-
work over time. Second, because rigidity merely mitigates the risk of hold-
up and does not eliminate it entirely, risk-averse interest groups confronting 
a new constitution may also decline to invest entirely. The sharply dichoto-
mous character of this election implies that small changes in behavior and 
judgment immediately following a constitution’s ratification will have large 
effects on its downstream chances for survival. Because they are highly 
sensitive to small, early-stage decisions, rigidity-based mechanisms of 
constitutional survival are likely to have ex ante a “knife-edged” quality. 
“Everything hinges on a single threshold determination”—to invest or not 
to invest?—with large, irreversible downstream consequences.290 The 
chances of success may be finely balanced, with small changes cascading into 
large differences in long-term payoffs. When a pool of rigid constitutions is 
observed ex post, it is likely that some cases will fall on either side of the 
knife’s edge.  
This knife-edge quality of rigidity-based mechanisms is intertwined 
with the path-dependent nature of early constitutional development. In 
path-dependent processes, “large consequences may result from relatively 
‘small’ or contingent events [and] particular courses of action, once intro-
duced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” as a result of feedback mecha-
nisms that entrench certain features of the status quo.291 In constitutional 
development under a rigid amendment rule, “many alternatives are possible 
at the early stages,” with the choice turning on seemingly small decisions, 
but after those decisions are made, “the path will be ‘locked in.’”292 How 
those early decisions will turn out in any given case is hard to predict. The 
decision to invest in a new constitution will depend on “random” effects,293 
such as the personalities of relevant political agents, accidents of historical 
circumstances, and other factors outside the constitutional designers capacity to 
predict or control. Sometimes, as with the Articles of Confederation, these 
 
290 Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 199 (2008).  
291 PIERSON, supra note 222, at 18-19; see also ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COM-
PLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 155-61 (1997) (discussing positive feedback and path 
dependence); NORTH, supra note 223, at 93-94 (developing the idea of path dependency). Path 
dependency comes in two flavors: It can arise due to “self-reinforcing sequences” of the kind 
described in Part II, or it can occur because of a “reactive sequence,” which is a “chai[n] of 
temporally ordered and causally connected events.” James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical 
Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC. 507, 508-09 (2000). 
292 JERVIS, supra note 291, at 156. 
293 PIERSON, supra note 222, at 18. 
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factors will not converge to produce constitutional endurance. This large 
sensitivity to randomly distributed exogenous stresses—the “importance of 
contingency”294—gives the appearance that a constitution’s fate rests on a 
knife’s edge in its early stages.295 Ex ante, survival is hard to predict or 
guarantee; ex post, the pattern of failures and successes can seem arbi-
trary.296  
The knife-edge quality of path-dependent processes may be compound-
ed in the case of rigidity-induced constitutional stability by a further 
dynamic. In most cases, the post-enactment game is not binary. Coopera-
tively produced public goods, such as new political or economic institutions, 
may require the participation of many actors. As a result, these institutions 
may be “step goods” that “will be produced only if enough members . . . of 
the group contribute.”297 Given the “strongly complementary” nature of 
contributions to step goods,298 potential contributors may not come forward 
unless they know or expect participation from most, if not all, other poten-
tial contributors. For example, each state only wanted to ratify the 1787 
Constitution if a sufficient number of other states did the same.299 At the 
same time, perfect contributory behavior was not needed. Hence, the 
decisions of North Carolina and Rhode Island not to ratify at first did not 
undermine the Constitution from going into operation in September 
 
294 JERVIS, supra note 291, at 156. 
295 See also Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games 
with Imperfect Public Monitoring, 10 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 173, 174-75 (2007) (describing path-
creating effects of knife-edged decisions).  
296 Cf. NORTH, supra note 223, at 98-99 (“Path dependency . . . is not a story of inevitabil-
ity in which the past neatly predicts the future.”). Indeed, for these reasons, path-dependent 
accounts are often parsed as more useful for explaining outliers, such as the U.S. Constitution, 
than for generating laws covering large sets of cases. See Mahoney, supra note 291, at 508 
(“Substantive analyses of path-dependent sequences offer explanations for particular outcomes, 
often ‘deviant outcomes’ or instances of ‘exceptionalism.’”). One example of the importance of 
contingent and unexpected events in constitutional development concerns the contested 1800 
election between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. When that contest ended in a deadlock 
between Jefferson and Aaron Burr, the immediate cause was the Framers’ failure to “think through 
the full ramifications” of the Vice President’s office. Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 255, at 555. 
The impasse would have been worse had not the Framers, perhaps foolishly, entrusted the Chief 
Justice with counting the contested ballots. Id. at 626-29.  
297 RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 55-59 (1982); see also THOMAS C. SCHEL-
LING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 213-14 (1978) (giving examples of the collective 
action problem).  
298 Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Goods, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2012). 
299 See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 36, at 124 (noting that even after four states had ratified, “the 
Constitution’s fate and the country’s future” hung in the balance). 
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1788.300 In cases of common contributions to step goods, the presence or 
absence of common expectations may make the difference between success and 
failure.301 Common beliefs that others will contribute are conducive to a 
constitution’s success, while a momentary and transient failure of political 
culture might undermine the whole constitutional project. 
For all these reasons, constitutional design founded on textual rigidity is 
not for the faint of heart, even if circumstances are otherwise favorable to 
the use of rigidity. A rigid constitution’s survival partly depends on events 
beyond a designer’s control. After the fact, what may seem to be manifest 
destiny may better be understood as luck.302 
B.  Revisiting and Revising the Normative Critiques of Article V 
The analysis, to this point, has offered a response to the puzzle of Arti-
cle V. But recognizing the potential for a causal link between textual rigidity 
and constitutional survival may also cast new light on the normative cri-
tiques of Article V highlighted in Section I.C. Recall that the most forceful 
of these focus on Article V’s countermajoritarian and “dead hand” conse-
quences. However, condemnation of Article V on countermajoritarian 
grounds seems ironic once the survival-related benefits of rigidity are 
recognized. After all, a party can only complain about the dead hand’s 
lingering grip if its constitution has actually survived long past its birth. 
Dead constitutions have no withering hold on democratic choice. In effect, 
critics who tender the countermajoritarian charge assume a baseline of 
constitutional survival to launch an attack on the very mechanism that 
produced such survival. The more appropriate comparison juxtaposes a 
world after a constitution’s death with life under the rigid constitution. In 
 
300 Id. at 428-30 (discussing the fact that North Carolina and Rhode Island had failed to 
ratify the 1787 Constitution on September 13, 1788, when “Congress formally announced that the 
Constitution had been ratified by the required number of states”).  
301 HARDIN, supra note 297, at 58-59; see also SCHELLING, supra note 297, at 215-16 (noting 
the roles of both knowledge and expectations). On the other hand, recent work on collective 
choice has argued that a thin rationality generates sufficient reason to believe that others will 
contribute. Richard Tuck, for example, argues that “if I am faced with a situation where an 
accumulation of relatively small contributions eventually leads to the crossing of some threshold 
which I would welcome, then in general I have a good instrumental reason to make one of the 
contributions, assuming that enough other ones will be made.” RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 
99, 102-03 (2008). Relevant to the circumstances of the 1787 Constitution, Tuck also argues quite 
persuasively that eighteenth- and nineteenth- century theorists would have perceived no 
individual reason to refrain from collaboration in the production of a collective good. Id. at 15. 
302 Cf. JERVIS, supra note 291, at 156 (“Looking back after the pattern is established, we may 
overestimate the degree of determinism involved.”). 
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other words, criticism of Article V as countermajoritarian is at best debata-
ble and at worst resting on a flawed (albeit implicit) baseline. 
Yet the analysis developed in this Article also hints at a way of rework-
ing the countermajoritarian critique of Article V. Rather than making an 
absolute claim about the deleterious consequences of textual rigidity, critics 
of Article V’s vice-like grip might instead focus on the possibility that an 
optimal constitutional amendment rule is not time-invariant. As the 
empirical work of Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton demonstrates, the risk of 
constitutional death looms largest in the first two decades of a constitution’s 
life cycle and drops off considerably thereafter.303 This finding suggests the 
particular value of a design mechanism to dampen the risk of failure in 
those first two decades. I have argued that, at least in the American context, 
it is plausible that early-stage mortality risk was mitigated, in important 
part, by the textual rigidity fostered by Article V.  
I have been careful thus far to specify that this justification only applies 
to an early period in the Constitution’s history. Further, I have not claimed 
that a constitution’s adult survival is assured when it survives its 
tempestuous adolescence. Rather, as constitutions age, they are threatened 
by different species of risk. In early periods, perhaps the most important 
risk is that parties will make insufficient investments in the new constitu-
tional order or that they will defect. As Part II argued, constitutional 
rigidity provides one solution to these risks. But in later periods, the risk of 
defections or collective action problems will likely have diminished as 
parties become more entangled in a constitution-specific ecosystem of 
national institutions. In those later periods, perhaps the most important 
threat to constitutional survival is likely to emerge from the failure to adapt 
to changing social, economic, and geopolitical circumstances, or to respond 
to exogenous shocks such as economic crises, military confrontations, or 
natural disasters. Further, claims by constituencies originally excluded from 
the constitutional bargain may become more pressing—the cases of African-
Americans and women being obvious examples in the American context—
and hence more destabilizing with time.304 All else being equal, the case for 
adaption in the face of this second variety of risk grows over time. Political 
 
303 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 131 (noting that mortality risk for constitutions peaks at 
age seventeen). 
304 Schwartzberg, supra note 38, at 74-75 (making this point with respect to the Equal Rights 
Amendment). Schwartzberg’s insightful work is a normative critique of supermajority rules. My 
project, by contrast, is not primarily normative, but concerned with ways in which constitutional 
design elicits stability in the face of certain distributions of political power and strategic behavior. 
Whereas she frames the claims of excluded constituencies as a matter of justice, here I treat them 
descriptively as merely extrinsic constraints on constitutional survival.  
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status quos at the time of ratification are unlikely to persist. The probability 
of salient exogenous shocks compounds over time. A constitution will not 
persist if it cannot adapt to industrialization, geostrategic shocks, or new 
kinds of security threats. Just as the risk of hold-ups and suboptimal 
investments diminishes, the cost of constitutional inflexibility rises. Rather 
than insufficient rigidity, the problem then becomes one of too much 
inflexibility. 
This analysis has consequences for the optimal level of constitutional 
rigidity. It suggests an optimal constitutional amendment rule (at least in 
the American constitutional order) may not be static but may instead be 
temporally sensitive. The constitution would have high barriers to change in 
the early decades of a nation, followed by an erosion of those barriers as 
exogenous pressures on the nation-state accumulate. Accordingly, the 
Framers cannot be faulted for being countermajoritarian. However, they can 
be criticized for not including a two-speed amendatory process in their 
Constitution: rigid like Article V for the first few decades to absorb the 
shocks of adolescence, but malleable thereafter to adapt to new exogenous 
strains and the shocks of a nation’s maturity. It is no response to say that 
such multi-speed amendment rules are hard to draft. Article V already 
imposes different barriers to textual amendments that concern the slave 
trade as well as certain elements of state sovereignty.305 So despite having 
drafting solutions on hand, the Framers just did not use them. 
The problem with Article V, then, is not that it yielded too rigid a con-
stitutional text. The problem is that it yielded too rigid a constitutional text 
for too long. What worked in the early Republic to address the peril of hold-
up risks became increasingly dysfunctional in the fluid economic and 
geopolitical contexts of the late nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first 
centuries.  
Nevertheless, it may be that later generations of Americans did create a 
multi-speed amendatory process that addressed the risk of hold-up in the 
Constitution’s early days and also mitigated the risk of failure to adapt. I 
suggest Americans did this by slowly developing extratextual, and perhaps 
even extralegal, tools for amending the Constitution through statutes or 
judicial decisions. These tools were developed to address the risk of non-
adaption in later periods after the value of textual rigidity decreased.  
 
305 An interesting parallel can be drawn with syndicated credit facilities, which use a plurali-
ty of voting rules for distinct contractual questions in the context of long-term multi-party 
contracts. See Leveraged Commentary & Data: A Guide to the U.S. Loan Market, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, 20-21 (Sept. 2012), http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_US/ 
2012_Guide_To_US_Loan_Market.pdf (discussing the structure, purpose, and utilization of 
different voting rules). I am grateful to Tony Casey for discussion on this point. 
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From this perspective, it is possible to posit two discrete periods in 
American constitutional development: the first dominated by durability, and 
the second characterized by fluidity and change. Alternatively, a more 
nuanced vision of the Constitution could see it as subject to a gradually 
changing amendment rate evolving solely with the emergence of new 
extratextual methods of interpretation, super-statutes, and constitutional 
moments. Whatever view of the Constitution’s evolution one takes, the 
central point I wish to emphasize here is the importance of change in the 
range of de facto amendment technologies over time, and, consequently, the 
rate of institutional development.  
Viewing American constitutional history in this light yields some reason 
to cease fretting so much about the legitimacy of judicial review as a 
channel of constitutional change.306 The Framers may not have perceived 
the wisdom of a multi-speed amendatory process that distinguished be-
tween different moments in the post-ratification period. But successive 
generations of federal politicians and voters have realized the value of 
making their constitutional order more fluid as the principal threat to that 
order evolved. Over time, they have invented, and have come to accept as 
legitimate, an increasing range of mechanisms for extra-textual constitu-
tional change ranging from bisectional compromises to landmark statutes to 
judicial review. All are means of adapting the 1787 settlement to new 
stresses, new challenges, and new realities.307 All are also products of 
subconstitutional institutions—the network of federal courts and a legisla-
ture operating in a robust national public sphere—rendered feasible by 
Article V–induced rigidity. The increasing plurality and inventiveness 
observed in the mechanisms of American constitutional change demon-
strates that Article V enabled the creation of instruments of constitutional 
change that could supersede the text’s seeming monopoly on such change. 
Moreover, that increasing heterogeneity of amendment mechanisms illumi-
nates the wisdom of Americans, who, having secured the benefits of rigidity, 
then felt a need for more fluidity and found ways over time to bring it about 
notwithstanding the barriers imposed by Article V.  
 
306 Much ink has been spilled expressing anxiety over judicial review. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, 
Lawrence Church on the Scope of Judicial Review and Original Intention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 113, 132-33 
(1991) (“‘Cumbersomeness’ affords no dispensation to the judiciary to ignore the Article V 
reservation of amendment to the people.”). For a more recent, and more subtle, version of the 
same argument, positing that judicial refusal to overrule incorrect precedent constitutes an illegal 
entrenchment of constitutional change, see Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011). 
307 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
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The potentially dire counterfactual to this story of institutional evolu-
tion merits emphasis. Had politicians and citizens not grasped the value of 
extra-textual mechanisms for constitutional change, the failure to adapt to 
evolving circumstances would likely have destabilized the Constitution. 
Industrialization, globalization of trade, growing military conflict, and 
endogenous social change all imposed unanticipated strains on the 
constitutional order. Hewing mechanistically to the putative originalist 
rules for issues such as congressional power and executive discretion would 
likely have invited national calamity and constitutional failure. Broad 
condemnations of our post-ratification methods of constitutional change 
hence fail to compare these methods to a plausible benchmark.308 Rather 
than comparing the present state of affairs against a utopian vision without 
those extra-textual modalities of constitutional change, critics should instead 
contrast the observed status quo to a world in which the Constitution has 
failed due to exogenous economic, military, or geopolitical strains.  
 On this view, the incremental discovery and adoption of extra-textual 
complements to Article V should be celebrated, not regretted. In the early 
Republic, Article V provided a robust means to respond to contested 
judicial decisions such as Chisolm v. Georgia309 and to fix a defective presi-
dential selection mechanism.310 In that era, textual rigidity was the more 
valuable default rule. As the Republic matured, the pressure for fundamen-
tal change compounded year by year.311 At some point, the need for consti-
tutional change outran the ability of national political institutions to 
provide it through Article V procedures. Had the Supreme Court (abetted 
by the White House and Congress) not increasingly assumed an assertive 
role in constitutional affairs after a century of relative quiescence,312 it is 
possible that external pressures would have inflicted considerable damage, 
 
308 This is similar to the failure of critics of Article V’s countermajoritarian nature to assess 
what would have happened without Article V–induced rigidity. 
309 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XI. 
310 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (altering the federal system for electing the president and 
vice president of the United States). 
311 Some commentators have argued that the sheer growth in the number of federal legisla-
tors also made it harder to assemble the necessary supermajoritarian coalitions for constitutional 
change. See, e.g., Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, supra note 1, at 652-64. This argument 
is partly in tension with the fact that the Progressive era produced a spate of constitutional 
amendments in quick succession.  
312 See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall 
Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221, 224 (1998) (explaining how, in early cases, the Marshall Court sought 
to “preserve judicial power by asserting its existence, thus establishing precedents for future use, 
while not actually attempting to challenge executive or legislative authority in any controversial 
way”).  
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and eventually even a fatal blow, to the Constitution. In this light, the 
emergence of increasingly robust judicial review simply responded to the 
increasing need for extra-textual vehicles of constitutional change without 
which the Constitution might not have survived.313 Similarly, Congress’s 
ability and willingness to fashion statutory schemes that refashioned 
fundamental elements of the constitutional order can be seen as a necessary 
form of innovation given Article V’s sheer obduracy. Even if not all ensuing 
changes to the constitutional order were welfare-enhancing, it is quite 
plausible to think that these mechanisms were beneficial in net. Viewed 
from this perspective, overwriting the 1787 constitution with extra-textual 
mechanisms of constitutional change through the federal courts seems less a 
problem, and more a solution, to Article V’s failure to specify a generally 
applicable dual-speed amendment regime.314 
In short, while not embodied in the Constitution’s text, our shifting 
amendatory regime has created a two-speed Constitution that has provided 
solutions to different threats to constitutional survival emerging in different 
periods. Rather than illicit substitutes for Article V, our now commonly 
deployed mechanisms of extra-textual constitutional change are better 
understood as both the complements and legacies of Article V. What some 
have construed as constitutional infidelity315 has in fact been part of our 
Constitution’s saving grace.316 
 
313 See Huq, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 79, at 586 fig.1 (displaying an increase in the 
number of laws held unconstitutional, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century). The historical 
path of judicial engagement depicted in Figure 1 is reflected in the first and last chapter headings 
of Lucas Powe’s history of the Court—“Very Modest Beginnings” and “An Imperial Court.” 
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008, at 1, 
312 (2009). 
314 I do not mean here to intimate any Whiggish air of inevitability about this development.  
315 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 111 (1999) ( focusing on “popular 
sovereignty” as expressed in the ratification process as the foundation of “originalist jurisprudence, 
and the Constitution itself”). Sophisticated originalists such as Whittington not only rely on the 
Founding for legitimacy, but also insist on a notion of “potential sovereignty” whereby accepting 
and giving effect to prior constitutional decisions preserves the ability of the people to make new 
higher law in the future. Id. at 156. Theories of potential sovereignty, however, fail to account for 
constitutional obduracy, let alone the possibility—developed in this Article—that such obduracy is 
itself a precondition to constitutional survival. In this way, originalism may be at war with the 
factually necessary predicates of continued constitutional survival.  
316 It is worth noting that the solution adopted in these later periods—extratextual amend-
ment through courts or super statutes—has no precise parallel in the private-contracting literature. 
The closest parallels I can conjure up—which is quite imprecise and unsatisfying—are the 
“cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b), 1325(a) (2012). Under this 
regime, some parties to a deal can force other parties to accept changes dictated by emergent 
circumstances. The difference in the constitutional context, of course, is that there are no 
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C.  Rethinking “Historical Gloss” 
Just as the analysis presented in this Article might provoke rethinking 
the merits of judicial review in the abstract, it also might promote reconsid-
eration of some common tools employed in constitutional interpretation. I 
develop in this final Section a suggestive example. It involves the link 
between textual rigidity and constitutional survival in relation to the 
interpretative deployment of what Justice Frankfurter called “a systematic, 
unbroken executive practice . . . [that] may be treated as a gloss” on the 
Constitution.317 Following Justice Frankfurter’s lead, the Court tends to rely 
on historical practice in areas like foreign affairs and separation of powers.318 
Despite the Court’s long usage of historical practice as a gloss on the 
Constitution’s text, concerns linger about whether interbranch acquiescence, 
long assumed to be a touchstone for reliance upon historical practice, 
supplies an appropriate guide of what evidence is salient to constitutional 
interpretation.319  
Judicial employment of historical gloss raises a host of important and 
interesting issues.320 This Article’s analysis of Article V simply suggests one 
dimension along which the salience of historical practice might be assessed, 
a dimension that has received little attention to date. Specifically, it suggests 
that historical practice ought to matter if it emerged in the first few decades 
of constitutional history, but perhaps less so otherwise. Institutions and 
practices established in the immediate wake of ratification played a critical 
role in stabilizing the Constitution through the virtuous-circle mechanism. 
Hence, they are plausibly viewed as but-for causes of the Constitution’s 
 
prespecified rules for such changes; an extratextual amendment often results from the application 
of brute political force, not the application of a legal rule.  
317 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
318 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (relying on the “historical 
glosses” on executive power in Article II with respect to the President’s authority over foreign 
affairs); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828-29 (1997) (citing the absence of historical practice as one 
ground for denying congressional standing); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) 
(citing Youngstown in deferring to historical practice surrounding the President’s foreign affairs 
power); see generally Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers 
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984) (analyzing the use of historcal practice and custom as 
extratextual sources of authority).  
319 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation 
of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (offering an account and a partial critique of the 
historical-gloss method of constitutional interpretation). 
320 See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 81 (2013) 
(exploring the interactions between interpretive methodological choice and the use of historical 
gloss).  
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longevity, and so are entitled to the benefit of the doubt when their consti-
tutional validity is considered.  
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has viewed both political 
parties and the central bank as constitutionally authorized creatures. This 
means not only that our two national political parties are not condemned as 
the sort of refractory faction denounced by Madison, but also that the 
Supreme Court affirmatively endorses the two-party system.321 State 
limitations on the associational rights of third parties with an eye to protect-
ing the two-party system have prompted much criticism.322 The Court’s 
solicitude for bipartisan competition, however, may be recast as its defend-
ing the contribution of the two-party system to the stabilization of the new 
constitutional order during the early Republic.  
Along similar lines, one can argue that Chief Justice Marshall was justi-
fied in sustaining the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, despite considerable popular resistance, because 
“[w]hen all branches of the government have . . . been acting on the 
existence of this power, nearly thirty years, it would seem almost too late to 
call it in question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain 
and manifest.”323 The Bank, as one of the pivotal anchors of the 1787 consti-
tutional disposition, had earned its legality.324 Indeed, even Madison, who 
had earlier condemned the Bank as unconstitutional, recognized as much by 
1816.325 By contrast, this theory of path-dependent institutional develop-
ment yields no legitimacy for the invocation of historical practices that 
emerged long after the early Republican period. Hence, the Court’s reluc-
tance to attribute significance to post–New Deal congressional use of the 
 
321 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (upholding 
restrictions on “fusion” candidates, and noting that states can enact election regulations that “in 
practice, favor the traditional two-party system”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 
189, 194-96 (1986) (upholding primary qualification requirements for third-party candidates to 
appear on the general election ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733-34, 736 (1974) (uphold-
ing restrictions on independent candidates for office, and affirming that states can take measures to 
prevent “unrestrained factionalism”). 
322 For criticisms in the wake of Timmons, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the 
Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans 
from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997). 
323 17 U.S. 316, 323 (1819). 
324 See David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1538 (2013) 
(book review) (discussing the way in which the first Bank garnered legitimacy through early 
practice). 
325 See Rockoff, supra note 257, at 648 (noting that, as President, Madison signed the bill that 
rechartered the Bank of the United States). 
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legislative veto in a case invalidating the device may be justified by reasons 
beyond those offered by the Court.326 
The link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival thus points 
toward a temporally sensitive account of how historical practice should be 
employed in constitutional interpretation. That approach would be 
consistent not only with extant case law, but also in accord with James 
Madison’s assertion in the Federalist Papers that constitutional meaning 
would be “liquidated and ascertained” through the initial practice of federal 
politicians in the early Republic.327 Those early years of the Republic were 
indeed pivotal—but not for reasons that Madison predicted or perceived. 
CONCLUSION 
Article V has long occasioned both embarrassment and evasion. But the 
textual rigidity it fostered should be celebrated as having been pivotal to the 
Constitution’s survival during the dire, storm-tossed days of the early 
Republic. Without the benefit of a sophisticated understanding of transac-
tion-cost economics, the Framers chanced on an effective solution to the 
problem of constitutional hold-ups. Their structural stroke of luck likely 
deepened the prospect of constitutional survival through the tempestuous 
first decades of the Constitution’s life. Sometimes, it appears, being lucky is 
as valuable as being wise.  
This Article focuses on explaining and defending textual rigidity’s func-
tion in the early Republic. But the Constitution’s survival through to the 
present day is testimony not merely to the virtues of textual rigidity—which 
responded solely to early-stage threats to constitutional survival—but also 
to later institutional innovations by politicians and judges who conjured 
extratextual complements to Article V. These innovations facilitated 
adjustment to exogenous shocks and evolving social, economic and political 
circumstances. The interaction between Article V and these extratextual 
modalities of constitutional change, I suggest, is more complex than the 
 
326 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-72 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting Con-
gress’s historical use of the legislative veto). The Chadha Court also cited evidence of presidential 
nonacquiesence, with eleven presidents “hav[ing] gone on the record at some point to challenge 
congressional vetoes as unconstitutional.” Id. at 942 n.13.  
327 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 245 ( J ames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). The 
Court has applied this dictum, for example, with respect to removal power questions. See Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] contemporaneous legislative exposition of the 
Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively 
participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be 
given to its provisions.”). But see Huq, Removal, supra note 83, at 12 & n.48 (questioning Myers’s 
historical account and the decision’s larger logic).  
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stark, binary incompatibility between constitutional fidelity and judicial 
license that is often posited by scholars. Rather than competitors, Article V 
and its extratextual analogs are partial complements. As much as it calls for 
reconsideration of Article V, in sum, my argument in this Article should 
invite a rethinking of the subtle and ever-shifting relationship between the 
diverse textual, judicial, and political modes of constitutional change 
invented across the decades and centuries by our fortunate, ingenuous, and 
peculiarly long-lived nation. 
